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Risks are inherent in the development and acquisition of new 
weapon systems whose performance requirements surpass those of currently fielded 
systems. If not anticipated and managed "up front and early" in the acquisition 
cycle, these risks can have profound effects on a program's cost and schedule and, 
ultimately, on the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Current Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition 
policy requires the Program Manager (PM) to develop and tailor an acquisition 
strategy for each new program. The strategy must include methods for assessing 
and managing contractor and Government risks. For the U.S. Marine Corps' 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) acquisition program, development 
of a risk management methodology is the responsibility of the Direct Reporting 
Program Manager (DRPM/AAAV). Accordingly, this thesis investigates the risk 
management methodology employed within the AAAV program, illustrates how 
this methodology converges with and diverges from risk management methodology 
prescribed by and/or suggested by the "Body of Knowledge" (BOK) relating to risk 
management, and analyzes the applicability of the "Spiral Model". This thesis 
concludes by recommending areas where the BOK and the DRPM's methodology 
can be enhanced and suggests areas warranting further research. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The National Security Act of 1947 charges the United 
States Marine Corps to "develop those phases of amphibious 
operations which pertain to the tactics, techniques, and 
equipment employed by landing forces." With these words the 
United States Congress codified the amphibious role of the 
Marine Corps. Marines throughout history have been called 
upon to provide the essential elements of mobility, 
expeditionary capability, and forward presence to our national 
security posture. One key ingredient to the Marine Corps' 
success in this endeavor has been the development of the 
amphibious tractor and its successors, most often referred to 
as the "amtrac". 
The amtrac has taken many forms since its introduction 
into the Marine Corps' inventory over 57 years ago. As 
technology and firepower have improved, so has the amtrac. 
This refinement continues today as the Marine Corps' Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) Program makes its way 
through the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process. 
The AAAV acquisition program will provide a replacement system 
for the current Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV7A1) which was 
fielded in 1972, underwent a major Service Life Extension 
Program (SLEP) in 1983-1986, and will be over 30 years old 
when the new AAAV family of vehicles is fielded. 
As demonstrated in previous amtrac acquisitions, the 
engineering design and development of the proposed amtrac 
version will incorporate more advanced and complex 
technologies to meet evolving security conditions and new 
tactical requirements. This direction reveals the basic tenet 
of U.S national defense technology and industrial base policy 
to rely on technological innovation to modernize its forces 
and maximize combat power. [Ref. l:p. 122] 
The demise of the Soviet threat and the rise of the "new 
world order" has precipitated and will continue to precipitate 
the realignment of defense resources to meet other foreign and 
domestic requirements. Predictably, the increased technical 
complexity of today's weapon systems and dwindling defense 
dollars coupled with the alteration of operational roles and 
missions in the Armed Services intensifies the element of 
uncertainty and "risk" within all DoD weapon system 
acquisition programs. 
As in any other major weapon system acquisition, success 
of the AAAV acquisition program is dependent on how well risk 
is assessed and managed. According to the General Accounting 
Office (GAO), greater attentiveness to risk assessment and 
risk management on the part of DoD Program Managers (PMs) is 
necessary [Ref. 2:p. 5]. DoD Directives require PMs to 
establish and maintain risk management programs to both assess 
and mitigate risk. Program Managers develop and tailor their 
risk management methodology based upon their individual 
interpretation and understanding of risk management concepts 
and requirements contained in the risk management "Body of 
Knowledge" (BOK). The BOK refers to current Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and DoD policies, directives, 
instructions, and guidance and includes reference materials 
derived from academic sources pertaining to the subject area 
of risk management. Examples of these sources include the 
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) and the Project 
Management Institute (PMI). 
The focus of this thesis is to examine the risk 
management BOK and risk management methodology in the AAAV 
acquisition program.   For the AAAV acquisition program, 
development and implementation of a risk management program is 
the responsibility of the Direct Reporting Program Manager 
(DRPM/AAAV). 
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The six objectives of this thesis are: 
1. To examine risk management methodology delineated in 
the risk management BOK. 
2. To analyze the DRPM/AAAV risk management methodology. 
3. To conduct a comparative analysis of risk management 
methodology delineated in the risk management BOK with 
methodology employed by the DRPM. 
4. To isolate areas where the DRPM's risk management 
methodology diverges from the risk management BOK and 
suggest improvements to the DRPM's methodology. 
5. To identify attributes and features of the DRPM's 
risk management methodology which would enhance and 
contribute to the risk management BOK. 
6. To assess the applicability of the "Spiral Model of 
Software Development & Enhancement" to the AAAV program. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following primary research question addresses the six 
aforementioned objectives: Can risk management and mitigation 
methodology implemented within the AAAV acquisition program 
contribute to the overall risk management "Body of Knowledge"? 
The following four subsidiary research questions support 
the primary research question: 
1. What risk management and mitigation policies, 
guidance, strategies, and techniques are delineated in 
the risk management BOK? 
2. What risk management and mitigation strategies and 
techniques have been employed by the DRPM/AAAV to address 
the principal risk areas identified in the AAAV program? 
3. How does the DRPM's risk management strategy differ 
from the strategy delineated in the risk management BOK? 
4. How can the "Spiral Model" be applied to the AAAV 
acquisition program? 
D.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Data and information contained in this thesis were 
collected from the following sources: 1) interviews between 
the author and acquisition professionals involved with the 
AAAV acquisition program and Marine Corps acquisition 
programs; 2) review of applicable systems acquisition and 
program management literature and documentation providing 
current policies and regulations; and 3) review of 
unclassified documentation acquired from the DRPM/AAAV Program 
Office. Major sources of literary materials utilized for this 
thesis were the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Systems 
Management Department Acquisition Library, the NPS main 
library, and the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). 
Data introduced and discussed in Chapters II and III, and 
analyzed in Chapter IV of this thesis were presented utilizing 
computer generated spreadsheets (see Appendices C and D) 
coupled with standard narrative text. The style of computer 
spreadsheet developed is the Data Source Matrix (DSM). The 
DSM format enables the efficient cross-referencing of a data 
source to its attributes. By ordering and categorizing data 
furnished in the matrices the matrices are tailored to 
facilitate subsequent analysis of inherently qualitative data. 
The general methodology used in Chapters II, III, and IV 
to organize, examine, and analyze both the risk management BOK 
literature and the AAAV program documentation (data sources) 
encompassed the following eight step process: 
1. Selection of a representative sample of systems 
acquisition and program management literature for 
evaluation as the risk management BOK in Chapter II, 
Literature Review. 
2. Selection of a representative sample of AAAV program 
specific management documentation and other related 
materials for evaluation in Chapter III, The Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program. 
3. Examination of each literature item (data source) to 
ascertain its respective risk attributes. 
4. Organization of risk attributes derived from each 
data source into functional risk attribute categories. 
5. Assignment of a risk content indicator code for each 
risk attribute profiled within a data source. 
6. Development of DSMs (Appendices C and D) to 
physically present the risk management attributes 
conveyed by BOK and AAAV program data sources. 
7. Summary of significant trends, anomalies and other 
observations detected during the BOK and AAAV program 
literature review. 
8. Accomplishment of a comparative analysis of the risk 
management BOK attributes with the AAAV acquisition 
program risk management attributes. 
A more detailed explanation of the research and analytical 
methodology employed is presented in Sections C, D, and E of 
Chapter II, and in Sections H, I, and J of Chapter III. 
E.  SCOPE & LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis was to ascertain and analyze the 
management strategies and techniques developed to assess 
technical, supportability, cost, and schedule risks within the 
AAAV acquisition program. This study compared and contrasted 
the DRPM's risk management and mitigation methods with methods 
prescribed by or suggested in the risk management BOK. 
It is important to recognize that the risk management BOK 
sampled is not inclusive of the total population of data 
sources existing which pertain to systems acquisition and 
program management. The BOK sample selected does, however, 
represent a balance of Government and non-Government views and 
adequately portrays risk management approaches provided in the 
risk management BOK and presently practiced "in the field". 
The author also acknowledges that the AAAV program 
documentation and other related materials sampled and examined 
is not inclusive of the total population of data sources 
existing which pertain to risk management in the AAAV program. 
The sample selected represents a balance of Government and 
non-Government views and adequately portrays risk management 
approaches applied, on-going, and planned in the AAAV program. 
This thesis incorporated opinions and comments of 
Government and defense industry officials to make inferences 
pertaining to the effectiveness of prime contractor and 
program manager's risk management plans. This thesis did not 
address insurance risk, safety risk, environmental risk, or 
accidental risk. These subjects are outside the DoD system 
acquisition and program management discipline and were 
likewise outside the scope of this study. 
F. ASSUMPTIONS 
It is assumed readers of this thesis: 1) have an 
understanding of the basic principles and current DoD policies 
governing systems acquisition and program management; 2) 
possess a comprehension of the basic concepts associated with 
the discipline of risk management; and 3) are familiar with 
basic amphibious warfare concepts and doctrine. 
G. TERMINOLOGY 
Acronyms and abbreviations utilized in this thesis, and 
their meanings, are furnished alphabetically in the List of 
Abbreviations and Acronyms, Appendix A. To alleviate 
confusion, terms not commonly known are explained in the 
Glossary of Terms, Appendix B. Whenever possible terms are 
defined according to DoD standard terminology. 
H.  ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
This thesis is structured into five chapters. Chapter I, 
Introduction. identified thesis objectives, primary and 
subsidiary research questions, and provides remarks concerning 
the scope, limitations, and assumptions framing the study. 
Chapter II, Literature Review, presents a survey of the BOK 
relating to the subject of risk management. The policies, 
guidance, strategies, and techniques derived from DoD 
directives, as well as related literature from academia is 
categorized and examined. Chapter III, The Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program, identifies risk management 
and mitigation methodologies applied to the principal areas of 
technical, supportability, cost, and schedule risk identified 
in the AAAV program. In Chapter IV, Comparison of Risk 
Management Methodologies, a comparative analysis between the 
risk management methodology employed by the DRPM/AAAV and the 
methodology suggested and/or prescribed within the BOK is 
presented. The significant areas of convergence and 
divergence between the two domains are noted and emphasized. 
Additionally, an analysis of the Spiral Model is delivered. 
Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations. furnishes 
concluding comments and recommendations drawn from the 
research and proposes areas warranting future research. 

II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a survey of the BOK relating to the 
subject of risk management. Risk management concepts, policy, 
guidance, strategies, and techniques derived from DoD 
generated literature, from literature published by 
organizations external to the DoD, and from academia is 
categorized and examined. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Risk management in DoD weapon systems procurement has long 
been practiced by acquisition professionals. Even before it 
was formalized in policy, most PMs practiced risk management 
in some form. The recurring interest in this subject by 
policy makers is clearly visible through recent history. In 
1969, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard wrote a memorandum 
to the Military Services that identified inadequate risk 
assessment as a major problem area. In 1981, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Carlucci published a memorandum which included 32 
"initiatives" aimed at improving the acquisition process. 
Initiative 11 required DoD action to increase the visibility 
of technical risk in budgets of weapon systems acquisition 
programs. Then in 1986 the GAO cited inadequate technical 
risk assessment as a problem area within the Military Services 
in a report released to the chairman of the Committee on 
Government Affairs, U.S. Senate. The need for more effective 
risk management will be felt even more strongly in the future 
as we face more challenging technical problems coupled with 
declining DoD budgets. As policy makers' interest in risk 
management continues to grow, PMs should anticipate greater 
emphasis from senior management in this area. [Ref. 3:p. 2] 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and DoD acquisition 
policy require weapon system PMs to develop and tailor an 
acquisition strategy for each new program. The strategy must 
include a process and plan and contain specific methods for 
evaluating and mitigating contractor and Government risks 
within the program. It is important to note that current 
policies do not require the risk management plan to be 
contained in a single document. Rather, the risk management 
plan is an integral part of the other written plans which are 
submitted during the planning and execution of the project 
[Ref. 3:p. 3] . This characteristic is a logical manifestation 
of the broader treatment of risk management as an integral 
part of the overall program planning and management process in 
a PM office. 
Program Managers faced with the task of initially 
developing or revising their risk management plans should 
consult all applicable systems acquisition and program 
management literature and documents which provide policy, 
regulation, and guidance. The breadth of this literature is 
extensive and includes, but is not limited to, the following 
categories: 1) previously mentioned memorandums, reports and 
initiatives; 2) OMB Circular A-109 Mai or Systems Acquisitions: 
3) DoD Directives and Instructions; 4) Service specific 
regulations; and 5) Military Standards (MIL-STDs). 
Supplementing Federal policy documents and Service 
department directives are literature resources available from 
academia and from private sector institutions. Major 
literature resources available to the PM from this latter 
category include, but are not limited to, the current family 
of technical guidebooks published by the DSMC and the series 
of management handbooks published by the PMI. 
In the aggregate, the segment of program management 
literature which pertains directly to the discipline of risk 
management composes the risk management BOK. The military 
acquisition professional preparing to undertake a risk 
management program should consider the examination of the risk 
10 
management BOK as an essential ingredient in the initial 
formulation or subsequent improvement of the risk management 
plan. 
C.  METHODOLOGY FOR CONDUCTING LITERATURE REVIEW 
The general methodology used in reviewing and documenting 
the evaluation of the risk management BOK encompassed the 
following six step process: 
1. Selection of a representative sample of military 
systems acquisition and program management literature 
materials (data sources) for subsequent analysis as the 
risk management BOK. 
2. Examination of each literature item (data source) to 
ascertain its respective risk attributes. 
3. Organization of risk attributes derived from each 
data source into functional risk attribute categories. 
4. Assignment of a risk content indicator code for each 
risk attribute profiled within a data source. 
5. Development of a DSM, Appendix C. 
6. Summary of significant trends, anomalies and other 
observations detected during the literature review. 
It is important to recognize that the risk management BOK 
sampled is not inclusive of the total population of data 
sources existing which pertain to systems acquisition and 
program management. The BOK sample selected does, however, 
represent a balance of Government and non-Government views and 
adequately portrays risk management approaches provided in the 
risk management BOK and presently practiced "in the field". 
Sections D and E of this chapter provide a more detailed 
explanation of each step in the general methodology outlined 
above. 
11 
D.  BODY OF KNOWLEDGE EXAMINED 
Current editions of the following 23 literature items 
were sampled from the risk management BOK for examination in 
this chapter. Information obtained from these data sources 
will be used for a comparative analysis performed in Chapter 
IV, Analysis of Risk Management Methodologies: 
1. Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-109 
Major Systems Acquisition. Washington, D.C., April, 1976. 
2. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5000.1 Defense 
Acquisition. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), 
February, 1991. 
3. Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 5000.2 Defense 
Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures, Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), February, 1991. 
4. Department of Defense, DoD Manual 5000.2-M Defense 
Acquisition Management Documentation and Reports. Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), February, 1991. 
5. Department of Defense, Military Standard-499B Systems 
Engineering. May 6, 1992. 
6. Department of Defense, Risk Management Concepts & 
Guidance. Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., March, 1989. 
7. Department of Defense, Program Manager's Notebook. 
Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., 
June, 1992. 
8. Department of Defense, Systems Engineering Management 
Guide, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, 
VA., January, 199 0. 
9. Department of Defense, Test and Evaluation Management 
Guide, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, 
VA., August, 1993. 
10. Department of Defense, Integrated Logistics Support 
Guide, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, 
VA., May, 1986. 
12 
11. Department of Defense, Defense Manufacturing 
Management Guide, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., April, 1989. 
12. Department of Defense, Competitive Production 
Handbook, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., August, 1984. 
13. Department of Defense, Sub-Contracting Management 
Handbook, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., May, 1988. 
14. Department of Defense, Technology Transfer Guide, 
Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA. , 
November, 19 88. 
15. Department of Defense, Warranty Guidebook, Defense 
Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA. , October, 
1992. 
16. Department of Defense, Mission Critical Computer 
Resources Management. Defense Systems Management College, 
Ft. Belvoir, VA., undated. 
17. Department of Navy, Best Practices: How to Avoid 
Surprises in the World's Most Complicated Technical 
Process. NAVSO P-6071, March, 1986. 
18. Department of Navy, Cost Realism Handbook. Navy- 
Office for Acquisition Research, Washington, D.C., May, 
1985. 
19. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Technical Risk 
Assessment-The Status of Current DoD Efforts", GAO/PEMB- 
86-5, Washington, D.C., April, 1986. 
20. Harp, D.M., A Management Case Analysis of the DoD 
Contractor Risk Assessment Program. M.S. Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., December, 1990. 
21. Yosua, D.A., "Risk Management in Military- 
Acquisition Projects", Military Project Management 
Handbook. Mc Graw-Hill, Inc., 1992. 
22. "Project and Program Risk Management: A Guide to 
Managing Project Risks and Opportunities", Project 
Management Institute, Upper Darby, PA., 1992. 
23. Boehm, B.W., "A Spiral Model of Software Development 
and Enhancement", Software Management. IEEE Computer 
Society Press, CA., 1993. 
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The above listed literature items represent the sample of 
thesis research data sources utilized. These data sources are 
portrayed in the same numerical sequence along the top 
horizontal margin of the risk management BOK DSM, Appendix C. 
E.  PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED 
1.  Taxonomy of Data 
The product of the literature review process is 
represented in the risk management BOK DSM, Appendix C. The 
DSM profiles risk management attributes directly extracted 
from the 23 data sources. These risk management attributes 
are portrayed along the left vertical margin of the matrix and 
are assembled into 20 distinct topical sub-categories. These 
attribute sub-categories, as listed below, correspond with and 
reflect risk management subject areas contained in the 23 
literature data sources sampled: 
1. Risk Definitions 
2. Risk Management Concepts 
3. Risk Management Planning 
4. Risk Identification 
5. Risk Assessment 
6. Risk Analysis 
7. Risk Documentation 
8. Risk Mitigation 
9. Risk Areas 
10. Acquisition Strategy Concerns 
11. Development and Design Concerns 
12. Software Considerations 
13. Prototyping and Technology Demonstration 
14 
14. Testing Considerations 
15. Manufacturing Considerations 
16. Contracting Considerations 
17. Schedule Considerations 
18. Cost and Budgeting Considerations 
19. Logistics Considerations 
20. Warranty Considerations 
The process of conducting the literature review included 
the task of qualifying each risk attribute. The objective of 
the attribute qualification process was to ascertain and 
distinguish the relative functional purposes of each risk 
attribute. In general, attribute functional purposes ranged 
from attributes which are optional (requiring no active or 
explicit response and existing to serve a purely informational 
purpose) to the obligatory, compulsory or "must do" tasks. 
A result of the attribute qualification process was the 
assignment of an appropriate risk content qualification code 
to each risk attribute profiled in the DSM. For simplicity, 
assignment of the risk content indicator code was dictated by 
its inherent functional purpose and was limited to one 
indicator code per risk attribute. The following legend 
defines the risk content indicator coding scheme utilized: 
1. "M" coded attributes denote a risk concept, task or 
process element which is mandatory for the PM 
organization to accomplish, incorporate or adopt. 
2. "R" coded attributes denote a risk concept, task or 
process element which is recommended or suggested for 
consideration, incorporation or adoption. 
3. "S" coded attributes denote a risk concept, task or 
process element specified, described or defined in an 
informational context. 
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4. "I" coded attributes denote a risk concept, task or 
process element which is implied or inferred by a data 
source. 
5. A "Blank" denotes no explicit nor implicit risk 
attribute coverage. 
2.  Synopsis of Research Findings 
The following summary statements provide an overview of 
the significant patterns, anomalies, and other observations 
detected during the literature review process as evidenced by 
the risk management BOK DSM, Appendix C. To facilitate cross- 
referencing of the matrix to a summary statement, the 
literature data source(s) and attribute sub-category from 
which a summary statement was derived are identified within or 
following the text of each statement: 
• A lack of uniformity and consistency exists in 
definitions of risk terminology and concepts provided 
in literature sources reviewed. Additionally, only one 
of the 23 data sources examined explicitly recommends 
that the PM establish a dictionary of risk terms and 
concepts. The lack of consistency in the BOK in 
defining risk concepts and terminology may create 
difficulties for the PM attempting to isolate the 
specific processes and measures to identify, assess, 
quantify, analyze, control, mitigate, and document risk 
within a particular program. Standardized risk 
management terminology would reduce opportunities for 
miscommunication. (Reference Attribute Sub-Category- 
Risk Documentation, Data Source 6). 
• DSMC published literature (Reference Attribute Sub- 
Category- Risk Management Concepts, Data Sources 6-8) 
and non-DoD published literature (Reference Attribute 
Sub-Category- Risk Management Concepts, Data Sources 
21-23) recommend or imply that the concept of risk 
management should not be treated as a separate 
function, but as an integral part of the overall 
planning activity in a PM office. These data sources 
simultaneously suggest that risk management needs to be 
made a more formal, systematic process rather than a 
subconscious activity. Some PMs and acquisition 
professionals may infer a disjunction between these two 
suggestions. 
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• Most BOK data sources mandate or recommend that the PM 
establish a risk management plan and institute measures 
to ensure the plan is assessed in conjunction with each 
milestone decision. Data sources, however, are neither 
consistent nor precise in detailing specific components 
to be incorporated in the risk management plan under 
development. This shortcoming could prompt a 
misallocation of a program's resources, ultimately- 
impeding development of a PM's risk management plan. 
(Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Risk Management 
Planning, Data Sources 1-4, 6-11, 13, 17-19, 21, 23). 
• BOK data sources reveal incompleteness in prescribing 
or recommending specific risk management actions to be 
taken during specific acquisition process phases. Only 
one data source (Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Risk 
Management Planning, Data Source 6) presents a basic 
framework of risk management actions recommended for 
implementation during specific acquisition phases. 
This shortcoming may also encourage misallocation of a 
program's resources, potentially impeding development 
of a PM's risk management plan. 
• Minimal explicit reference to the potential for 
applying Total Quality Management (TQM) principles to 
the risk management discipline was evident in the data 
sources examined. All data sources do, however, 
implicitly illustrate or describe areas of opportunity 
within the risk management discipline where TQM 
principles could be applied. A commitment made by a PM 
to implement basic TQM principles, i.e., 1) to focus on 
the user; 2) to continuously improve processes; 3) to 
empower personnel, and 4) to eliminate non-value added 
activity, would complement a PM's risk management 
effort. (Reference Data Sources 1, 6-8, 10, 22, 23). 
• Numerous occurrences of overlap and redundancy between 
and among risk attribute categories and data sources 
were detected. This idiosyncrasy is attributed to the 
previously mentioned pattern of definitional 
inconsistency coupled with the basic notion conveyed in 
the BOK that risk management is treated as a fully 
integral part of the overall planning activity in a PM 
office and not as a separate function. (For example; 
Reference Attribute Sub-Categories- Risk Management 




A majority of data sources convey the importance of the 
contractor's risk assessment and mitigation plan. 
(Reference Attribute Sub-Categories- Risk Assessment, 
Risk Mitigation, Risk Areas, Software Considerations, 
Testing Considerations, Contracting Considerations, 
Data Sources 1-3, 5-8, 10, 11, 13, 16-18, 20-23). 
Risk management attributes profiled in software (S/W) 
oriented data sources generally parallel and complement 
related attributes contained in most non-S/W data 
sources. (Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Software 
Considerations, Data Sources 16, 23). 
• The role of a viable test and evaluation (T&E) program 
as an important component of the overall risk 
management planning is reiterated by a majority of data 
sources. (Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Testing 
Considerations, Data Sources 1-3, 7-11, 15, 21). 
• Data sources provide superficial attention to the 
utility of the warranty as a viable component of a risk 
management plan. Only three data sources provide 
explicit reference to the warranty as a risk management 
component-. (Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Warranty 
Considerations, Data Sources 8, 11, 14). 
• Data sources provide superficial coverage to the 
utility of increasing Government attention to sub- 
contractor activities as a risk reduction method. 
(Reference   Attribute   Sub-Category-   Contracting 
Considerations, Data Source 13). 
F.  SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a survey of DoD and non-DoD 
generated literature relating to the subject of risk 
management. The product of the literature review process was 
represented in the risk management BOK DSM, Appendix C. 
Specific risk management concepts, policies, and guidance were 
categorized and profiled as risk attributes in this matrix. 
The matrix can assist any acquisition professional engaged in 
developing or revising a risk management program. In Chapter 
111
' The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program, the DSM 
technique is again applied to present and evaluate risk 
management methodology employed by the DRPM/AAAV. 
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III. THE ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is twofold.  First, an 
explication of the AAAV program's historical development, 
current status and acquisition strategy will be presented. 
This background information is fundamental to the unification 
of the analytical framework of this thesis.  Second, the risk 
management and mitigation strategies and techniques applied, 
on-going, and planned for the principal areas of technical, 
supportability, cost, and schedule risk identified in the AAAV 
program will be categorized and presented. The same research 
and analytical methodology used in Chapter II, Literature 
Review, including the DSM, will be employed in this chapter. 
B. PROGRAM BACKGROUND & DESCRIPTION 
A Mission Area Analysis (MAA) was initiated by the Marine 
Corps in 1987 to identify deficiencies in amphibious assault 
capability. The MAA determined that the AAV7A1 demonstrated 
significant deficiencies, during both water and land 
operations, in offensive and defensive firepower, water speed, 
land speed, agility and mobility, armor protection, and 
overall system survivability. These deficiencies prompted the 
Marine Corps to include the AAAV Mission Need Statement (MNS) 
addressing a replacement for the AAV7A1 in its Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) 90-91 submission to the DoD. 
Upon receipt of the MNS by DoD, a series of Milestone 0 
(MS 0) program reviews were conducted by the Defense Resources 
Board (DRB) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The 
purpose of these reviews was to validate the Marine Corps' 
stated mission need and its implied request for initiation of 
a major system new start to rectify operational deficiencies. 
Favorable endorsements were received from both the DRB and 
DAB; however, the Marine Corps was directed to analyze a 
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broader range of alternatives in addition to those already- 
identified in the AAAV MNS. 
Due to this expansion of scope, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)) edited the original MNS and 
retitled the program the Advanced Assault Amphibian (AAA vice 
AAAV). A copy of this edited MNS was attached to both the MS 
0 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) and Program Decision 
Memorandum (PDM) received in July and August 1988. Receipt of 
the ADM and PDM constituted transition to MS 0 and the 
commencement of the Concept Exploration/Definition (CE/D) 
phase of the AAA program. On 19 July 1993, the USD (A) changed 
the name back to the AAAV. [Ref. 5:p. 3] 
The AAAV is an armored, tracked amphibious combat vehicle 
that carries a reinforced rifle squad and has a crew of three. 
The AAAV will allow the Navy and Marine Corps team to link 
maneuver in ships and maneuver ashore enabling Operational 
Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS). OMFTS provides both ships and 
landing forces with sea space for maneuver, surprise, and 
protection. The AAAV will be the principal means of armor- 
protected land and water mobility and direct fire support for 
infantry during combat operations. It is an inherently 
multipurpose system ideally suited to overcome the challenges 
imposed upon Naval Expeditionary forces: the limitation of 
space aboard amphibious ships and the impediments to maneuver 
in the littorals. [Ref. 6:p. 1] 
The AAAV family of vehicles will consist of a personnel 
variant (AAAV(P)) and a command and control variant (AAAV(C)). 
The AAAV program will provide a replacement system for the 
current AAV7A1 that was fielded in 1972 and underwent a major 
SLEP in 19 83-86. The AAV7A1 will be over 3 0 years old and 
will have ended its useful service life when the AAAV is 
fielded. The AAAV will correct the existing deficiencies 
found in the AAV7A1. 
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C.  PROGRAM STATUS & SCHEDULE 
Although no formal exit criteria were published for the 
CE/D phase, guidance was issued in three areas in the PDM 
dated 14 July 1988, and the ADM dated 19 August 1988: 
1. Examine all alternatives of placing infantry ashore, 
not just a new amphibious vehicle. 
2. Explore standardization with the Army's Armored 
Family of Vehicles (AFV) program. 
3. Revalidate the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) 
acquisition objective. 
The number of alternatives identified in the MNS was 
increased from three to 13 candidate systems. These systems 
fell into four broad categories: 1) high-speed amphibians; 2) 
low-speed amphibians; 3) non-amphibians; and 4) non-vehicles. 
Of the 13 alternatives analyzed in the program's Cost and 
Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) the Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle-Fast (AAAV-F) was determined by the 
Marine Corps to be the preferred alternative to meet the 
requirements of the replacement system to the AAV7A1. The 
operational necessity of this program is critical to the 
continuing combat effectiveness of United States' Naval 
expeditionary forces. 
The AAAV program was directed to aggressively pursue 
technical risk-reducing activities by the Navy Acquisition 
Executive in 1991 during the CE/D phase. All significant 
technical risk-reducing projects for the AAAV have been 
completed, formally reviewed, and favorably endorsed by the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Research (CNR). [Ref. 6:pp. 1-2] 
A discussion of these risk-reducing activities is provided in 
Section K of this chapter. 
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Figure 1 contains the program master schedule from the 
Integrated Program Summary (IPS) depicting selected key major 
activities in relation to MS decision points, as well as the 
present Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Full 
Operational Capability (FOC) dates. The Demonstration and 
Validation (D&V) phase contract is planned to be 49 months in 
length, during which time one AAAV prototype (personnel 
variant) will be fabricated and tested. 
PROGRAM STRUCTURE - ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE 
FY95    FY9o    FY97 KY98    FT99    FYOO    FY01    FY02    FY03    KY04    ?T05    FY06 FY07     FY08    FT09     FY10    ?YH     ?YU 
IOC FOC |    DEM VAL PHASE       I 
MILESTONES 
-f 1      ENGR & MFGR D EV PHASE 




RELEASE D&V EMD                        LRIP                FRP 
CONTRACT 
AWARDS D&V E.MD                             LRIP                 ™* 
EVENTS .aV .**. .aW         M.   Jk. JL.      -««V    .**.        Jk. m.       ^k. 
ISR ISR 
i    a 
l. 
PRO 
PDR      ISR ISR  PRR   CDR   PRR 
in    IV 
PRR FCA/PCA/FQR 
DELIVERIES AAAvG                                  G 
TOTYPE                                  II .AAAV 
LRIP | FULL RATE PRODUCTION   j 
101 AAAV j                 912AAAVj 
PROTOTYPES 
DT&E '                                  |     DTD 
DTI 
UTiCRE 
LFT&E 1 LPT1 
1  „„■ ■ —J PORT 
OT&E OT,Ü                  tOTiECZÄup' 1"] FOT&E 
REPORT 
FT«   r/96   nn FY9S    KY99     FYOO    PY01     FYM     FT03    rYfH     PYOS    FTO« FY07     F>08    PT09     FY10    rYll     FYU 
IOC - Injaai Opermaonai CjcMtaüiry 
FOC - Final Opcnaoul Cioabiliry 
34V - Demomcraaon •& Vajjdaaon 
EMD - tn^lneenns «£ Manafacninilg Development 
LRTP - Low Rate injoaJ Prodncnoo 
FRP ■ Fall Rjir Production 
ISR - Interim Svitemj Review 
PDR - Pretimraary D<xa(B Rcnw 
PRR - Prodacsoa BniiiKu Review 
CDR - Criäcmi Deaa>n Renew 
FCA - Paacaoaai Caaäcaraaoa Aadit 
PCA - Phvncai Caa^vrtaot Aadit 
FOR - formal Quiificidoa Renew 
DT4E - Developmental Tat <4 £v«ln>ooa 
UT4E - L/re Fire Tal £ Evaluation 
EOA - Earl? Open aooal AiioimcDt 
OT<tcE - Operaoonai Test <& Evaluation 
BLRIP • Bevo«d LRIP 
POTAE - Final Opcraooaal Teat St. Evaluation 
Figure 1.  Program Structure for the AAAV Program 
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Primary engine 400 hour North Atlantic Treaty- 
Organization (NATO) and 1000 hour durability tests will also 
be accomplished during this contract along with fabrication 
and testing of the AAAV(C) communications suite. 
Developmental Test I (DT I), as well as an Early Operational 
Assessment (EOA) and Operational Test I (OT I) are scheduled 
for completion by FY 99. 
Milestone II is presently scheduled for FY 00. The 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase will be 
a total of 69 months from contract award, during which 11 
prototypes will be fabricated and tested. Live Fire Test and 
Evaluation (LFT&E) will be conducted on two production 
representative prototypes prior to delivery of Low Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP) vehicles. A 48 month LRIP 
production contract will be awarded during the EMD phase for 
production of 101 AAAVs. Initial Operational Test and 
Evaluation (IOT&E) will utilize nine production representative 
prototypes, as well as four LRIP AAAVs. DT II is scheduled 
for FY 03-04 with a Full Rate Production (FRP) MS and IOC in 
FY 06. A 78 month FRP and Deployment phase will terminate in 
FY 12 with delivery of 1013 AAAVs. [Ref. 6: pp.2-3] 
D.  ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The baseline acquisition strategy for the AAAV includes 
D&V, EMD, and FRP phases. LRIP will be initiated near the end 
of EMD and will be immediately followed by the FRP phase. 
Figure 2, coupled with the information in the following 
subsections, furnish the detailed descriptions of each 
acquisition cycle phase. [Ref. 6:pp. C-2-C-4] 
1.  Demonstration & Validation Phase 
One prime contractor is planned for the D&V phase. The 
D&V Request for Proposal (RFP) will be released promptly 
following MS I program approval. On receipt of contractor 
proposals,  the Government will commence a formal source 
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selection that will result in a single cost-reimbursement 
award-fee contract planned for award in the 1st Quarter (QTR), 
FY 9 6 for the conduct of the D&V phase effort. The primary- 
focus of the D&V phase will be the maturation of the prime 
contractor's AAAV design, NATO and full durability testing of 
the AAAV engine, and the fabrication and testing of a AAAV(P) 
prototype and a AAAV(C) communications suite prototype. The 
prime contractor will be fully responsible for development of 
the preferred engine and the Government will pursue 
development of alternative engines. 
2. Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase 
A cost-reimbursement EMD contract will be awarded to the 
D&V phase contractor during the 2nd QTR, FY 00. The primary 
focus of the EMD phase will be the completion of the 
contractor's AAAV design, fabrication, and testing of 11 EMD 
prototypes, and conduct of LRIP. Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) will validate the AAAV 
configuration as a complete system from the standpoint of 
reliability, durability, availability, and supportability. 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) will also 
finalize manufacturing technology and facilities readiness, 
and demonstrate the system's overall operational suitability 
for employment in combat operations. 
3. Full Rate Production & Deployment Phase 
The LRIP contract awarded during EMD will result in prime 
contractor production of AAAVs at an increasing rate through 
FY 05, 06, and 07. Following the FY 06 DAB FRP MS review, a 
fixed-price FRP contract will be awarded to the EMD/LRIP 
contractor for production of an additional 912 AAAVs. 
Deliveries of the FRP AAAVs will begin in FY 07 at a rate of 
2 00 per year commencing 21 months after contract award and 
continuing at this rate through FY 11. 
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E.  ACQUISITION APPROACH 
The AAAV program is pursuing an acquisition approach to 
derive maximum benefit from previously developed combat 
vehicles such as the Ml Main Battle Tank (MBT) , the Bradley- 
Fighting Vehicle (BFV), and the predecessor to the AAAV, the 
AAV7A1. Numerous Non-Developmental Item (NDI) subsystems have 
been identified by the competing prime contractors (General 
Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and United Defense Limited 
Partnership (UDLP)) for use in their respective designs. The 
DRPM/AAAV is applying resources toward application and 
integration of existing armored vehicle technologies to its 
operational mission. The DRPM/AAAV has taken full advantage 
of lessons learned in the armored vehicle and amphibious 
vehicle technology base, ensuring GDLS and UDLP have had 
access to all available information. 
Numerous amphibious vehicle technology demonstrators have 
been tested and the results promulgated. General Dynamics 
Land Systems and UDLP developed viable concept designs through 
use of extensive data from the amphibious vehicle technology 
base program. The contractors' development effort was 
supported by information derived from numerous technical 
activities funded under CE/D contracts. Both GDLS and UDLP 
are experienced combat vehicle developers and manufacturers. 
Pre-Planned Product Improvements for the AAAV have not 
been developed nor validated at this time. However, the 
vehicle's design requirements include mandatory growth 
potential for weight, power, offensive weapons, and 
electronics. Recognizing the rapid acceleration in technology 
applicable to combat vehicle systems and to accommodate 
various propulsion alternatives, each prime contractor's AAAV 
is designed with an "Open Architecture" to accept installation 
of alternatives without incurring significant rearrangement of 
internal subsystems and components. 
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The D&V prime contractor will have total system 
responsibility as the AAAV integrator. No Government 
Furnished Material nor Equipment (GFM/GFE) is envisioned for 
the D&V or EMD phases other than weapons, ammunition, and 
communications equipment. Major subcontractors include 
manufacturers of the engine, the weapons sight and fire 
control, and the suspension system. These subcontractors and 
others will be examined by the DRPM/AAAV for potential 
breakout during the EMD phase. [Ref. 6:pp.- C-6-C-7] 
F.  ACQUISITION STREAMLINING INITIATIVES 
The AAAV program examined several acquisition 
streamlining initiatives and alternative program structures. 
Several have included the deletion or combination of 
acquisition phases. One significant streamlining initiative 
is the DRPM/AAAV request for an exception to the requirement 
for competitive prototyping (i.e., 10 U.S. Code, Section 2438, 
"Major Programs: Competitive Prototyping, "Subsections (a) and 
(b) , per subsection (c), "Exception") during the D&V phase. 
Approval of this exception is projected to result in 
significant cost savings to the Government. 
The competing prime contractors are performing multiple 
reviews of D&V specifications with the goal of complete 
removal of military specifications and standards. They have 
been specifically directed by the DRPM/AAAV in the D&V RFP to 
suggest commercial equivalent replacements for these 
specifications and standards. [Ref. 6:p. C-8] In addition, 
during D&V any surviving military specifications and standards 
cited in the RFP will be provided for guidance only and 
requirements will be stated in terms of performance vice 
design criteria. In an effort to commercialize and streamline 
future contracts to the maximum extent possible, the D&V 
contractor will draft the EMD, LRIP, and FRP contract 
Statements of Work (SOW) and specifications prior to final 
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Government editing. Maximum use of streamlining initiatives 
will continue to be pursued by the DRPM in this deliberate 
program structure. [Ref. 6:p. C-8] 
G.  COMPETITION & CONTRACT TYPES 
Award of the D&V contract is expected to be made using 
Other Than Full and Open Competition. Authority for this is 
10 U.S. Code, Section 2304, Subsections (c) and (1) as 
implemented in FAR 6.3 02-1, "only one source or a limited 
number of sources." Competition will be restricted to UDLP 
and GDLS, who are the only reasonable prospective sources due 
to their extensive work on the AAAV since 1990. 
The D&V contract will require competition in 
subcontracting to the maximum extent practicable, by use of 
the "Competition in Subcontracting" clause, FAR 52.244-5. 
Competition will be sought, promoted, and sustained for 
subsystems, major components, spare parts, and services as the 
AAAV design is refined during D&V. 
Most data will be delivered to the Government with 
limited rights. However, it is anticipated that some data may 
remain proprietary, either because of the use of commercial or 
NDI components or because of development of components using 
private or Independent Research and Development (IR&D) funds. 
No detailed component breakout review has been performed 
as yet due to the development status of the program and the 
AAAV design. Once a D&V contractor is selected and its AAAV 
system design and subsystem selection is complete, a detailed 
component breakout review will be performed. 
The D&V contract will be a Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) 
type contract. The EMD contract will also be a cost- 
reimbursement type contract, most likely a Cost-Plus- 
Incentive-Fee (CPIF). 
The LRIP contract (facilitization and first lot of 
vehicles) will be a cost-reimbursement contract. 
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The remaining lots of LRIP vehicles, covered by LRIP contract 
option, will most likely be fixed-price. The FRP contract 
will be Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP). [Ref. 6:pp. C-10-11] 
H.  METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
The general methodology used in reviewing and documenting 
the risk management and mitigation strategies and techniques 
applied, on-going, and planned for the principal areas of 
technical, supportability, cost, and schedule risk identified 
in the AAAV program encompassed the following six step 
process. This process is functionally equivalent to that 
employed in Chapter II, Literature Review: 
1. Selection of a representative sample of AAAV program 
management documentation and other related materials 
(data sources) for subsequent analysis. 
2. Examination of each data source to ascertain their 
respective risk attributes. 
3. Organization of risk attributes derived from each 
data source into functional risk attribute categories. 
4. Assignment of a risk content indicator code for each 
risk attribute profiled within a data source. 
5. Development of a DSM, Appendix D. 
6. Summary of significant trends, anomalies and other 
observations detected in the literature reviewed. 
It is important to recognize that the AAAV program 
documentation and other related materials sampled is not 
inclusive of the total population of data sources existing 
which pertain to risk management in the AAAV program. The 
sample does, however, represent a balance of Government and 
non-Government views and adequately portrays risk management 
approaches applied, on-going, and planned in the AAAV program. 
Sections I, and J of this chapter provide a more detailed 
explanation of each step in the methodology outlined above. 
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I.  PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION EXAMINED 
Current editions of the following 17 AAAV program 
management documents and related literature items were sampled 
for examination in this chapter and will support the 
comparative analysis performed in Chapter IV, Comparison of 
Risk Management Methodologies: 
1. U.S. Marine Corps, Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD) for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) , 
CG. MCCDC, Quantico, VA., March 24, 1994. 
2. U.S. Marine Corps, Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV) Program Integrated Program Summary (IPS), 
Office of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, 
Arlington, VA., October, 1994. 
3. U.S. Marine Corps, Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle  (AAAV) 
Program. Office of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, 
Arlington, VA., July 8, 1994. 
4. U.S. Marine Corps, System/Segment Specification (Type 
"A" Spec.) for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
(AAAV) Program, Office of the Direct Reporting Program 
Manager, Arlington, VA., August, 1994. 
5. U.S. Marine Corps, Human System Integration (HSI) 
Plan for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) 
Program. Office of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, 
Arlington, VA., March 8, 1994. 
6. Department of Navy, Technical Assessment. Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) Updated Concepts. 
Office of Advanced Technology, Chief of Naval Research, 
Washington, D.C., November 15, 1992. 
7. Center for Naval Analysis, Advanced Amphibious 
Assault (AAA) Program Cost and Operational Effectiveness 
Analysis (COEA) : Ship-to-Shore Analysis. Alexandria, VA., 
July, 1990. 
8. Center for Naval Analysis, Life Cycle Costs of 
Advanced  Amphibious   Assault   System  Candidates, 
Alexandria, VA., January, 1991. 
29 
9. Center for Naval Analysis, Revised Life Cycle Costs 
for Advanced Amphibious Assault System Candidates, 
Alexandria, VA., April, 1991. 
10. U.S. Marine Corps, An Opportunity for Change: A 
Briefing for the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Office 
of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, Arlington, VA., 
June, 1993. 
11. U.S. Marine Corps, "Commandant of the Marine Corps' 
AAA Article", AAV-AAA Requirements Office, MCCDC, 
Quantico, VA., September, 1993. 
12. Department of Defense, Audit Report: Acquisition of 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles, Rpt.No. 93-116, DoD 
Inspector General, Washington, D.C., June 18, 1993. 
13. Department of Defense, FY-94 Integrated Priority 
List (IPL) Administrative Guidelines. Defense Simulation 
and Modeling Office (DMSO), Washington, D.C., 1994. 
14. Hölzer, Robert., "Testing Simulation's Worth", Navy- 
Times , January 24, 1994. 
15. Robertson, B.J., "From Ship to Shore-And Well 
Beyond", Armed Forces Journal. September, 1994. 
16. Corcoran, Michael. A., An Evaluation of Competitive 
Procurement Methodologies Applicable to the AAA Program, 
M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., 
December, 1988. 
17. Clark, James. W., Acquisition Streamlining: A Viable 
Method for Accelerating Procurement of the AAAV, M.S. 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., 
December, 1993. 
The above listed program management documents and related 
literature items are portrayed in the same numerical sequence 
along the top horizontal margin of the DSM for the AAAV 
Program, Appendix D. 
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J.  PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED 
1.  Taxonomy of Data 
The product of the literature review is represented in 
the DSM for the AAAV Program, Appendix D. The matrix profiles 
risk management attributes extracted from the 17 data sources. 
Attributes are portrayed along the left vertical margin of the 
matrix and for simplicity are assembled into 17 distinct 
topical sub-categories. Sub-categories, as listed below, 
correspond with and reflect risk management topics contained 
in the 17 AAAV program management data sources sampled: 
1. Risk Definitions 
2. Risk Management Planning 
3. Risk Assessment 
4. Risk Analysis 
5. Risk Documentation 
6. Risk Mitigation 
7. Risk Areas 
8. Acquisition Strategy 
9. Development and Design 
10. Prototyping and Technology Demonstration 
11. Testing 
12. Modeling and Simulation 
13. System Integration 
14. Contract Management 
15. Cost and Budgeting 
16. Logistics Management 
17. Software Design and Development 
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As in the risk management BOK literature review performed 
in Chapter II, Literature Review, the process of conducting 
the program management documentation and literature review for 
the AAAV program included the task of qualifying each risk 
attribute profiled in a data source. 
The objective of the attribute qualification process was 
to ascertain and distinguish the relative functional purposes 
of each risk attribute profiled in a data source. In general, 
attribute functional purposes ranged from attributes which 
document a specific risk management strategy or technique 
previously applied within the AAAV program to attributes 
representing activities suggested by program proponents and 
oversight agencies. 
A product of the attribute qualification process was the 
assignment of an appropriate risk content qualification code 
to each risk attribute profiled in the DSM, Appendix D. For 
simplicity, assignment of the risk content indicator code was 
dictated by its inherent functional purpose and was limited to 
one indicator code per risk attribute. The following legend 
defines the risk content indicator coding scheme utilized: 
1. "A" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which has been 
applied within the AAAV program. 
2. "0" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which is on-going 
within the AAAV program. 
3. "P" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which has been 
identified for future application within the AAAV 
program. 
4. "R" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which has been 
recommended for application within the AAAV program. 
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5. "*" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which has been 
applied, is ongoing, and planned for continued 
application within the AAAV program. 
6. "S" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy, technique, or condition which 
has been specified as effecting the AAAV program. 
7. A "Blank" denotes no explicit nor implicit risk 
attribute coverage. 
2.  Synopsis of Research Findings 
The following summary statements provide an overview of 
the significant patterns, anomalies, and other observations 
detected during the program management documentation and 
literature review process as evidenced by the DSM, Appendix D. 
To facilitate cross-referencing of the matrix to a summary 
statement, the specific literature data source(s) and 
attribute sub-category from which a summary statement was 
derived are identified within or immediately following each 
summary statement: 
• Most AAAV program data sources describe, in 
considerable detail, the overarching function and 
specific components of the Technology Base program 
associated with the AAAV development effort. The 
purpose of the Technology Base program was repeatedly 
featured as a key aspect of the DRPM's overall risk 
management, risk assessment, and risk mitigation 
efforts. (Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Risk 
Mitigation, Data Sources 2-4, 6, 10, 11, 15, 17) . 
• AAAV program data sources describe specific acquisition 
management activities to be taken during specific 
acquisition phases, as well as those activities planned 
in conjunction with subsequent MS decision reviews. 
(Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Acquisition 
Strategy, Data Sources 2-4, 16, 17). 
• AAAV program data sources illustrate the direct 
association, linkage, and interdependence between the 
DRPM's evolutionary acquisition strategy (i.e., 
Paradigm Shift Model) and risk management and 
mitigation effort. (Reference Attribute Sub-Category- 
Acquisition Strategy, Data Sources 2-4, 10, 11, 16, 17). 
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• Most data sources explicitly show that proven Total 
Quality Management (TQM) principles: 1) user focus; 2) 
continuous process improvement and problem prevention; 
3) innovation in processes, products, services; and 4) 
participatory management [Ref. 10:p. 13-3] are employed 
as components of the DRPM's risk management strategy. 
(Reference Attribute Sub-Categories- Acquisition 
Strategy, Risk Documentation, Risk Mitigation, 
Development and Design, Prototyping and Technology 
Demonstration, Testing, Logistics Management, Data 
Sources 2-5, 10-12, 15, 17). 
• AAAV program attribute sub-categories evaluated in this 
Chapter and profiled in Appendix D are not identical to 
risk management BOK attribute sub-categories evaluated 
in Chapter II and profiled in Appendix C. A more 
detailed analysis of this anomaly is presented in 
Chapter IV, Analysis of Risk Management Methodologies. 
• Several AAAV program data sources discuss and emphasize 
the role/importance in using prototypes and technology 
demonstrators in the acquisition process. (Reference 
Attribute Sub-Category- Prototyping and Technology 
Demonstration, Data Sources 2, 3, 6, 11, 16, 17). 
• Several AAAV program data sources reveal that the 
DRPM's acquisition strategy incorporates the following 
risk mitigation elements: 1) development and employment 
of advanced technologies for each vehicle subsystem; 2) 
prudent application of Off-The-Shelf (OTS) and NDI 
components; 3) use of common subsystems and components 
in all AAAV mission role variants; and 4) transfer of 
current communications, electronics, and navigational 
equipment from the AAV7A1. (Reference Attribute Sub- 
Categories- Development and Design, Prototyping and 
Technology Demonstration, Logistics Management, Data 
Sources 1-5, 11) . 
• AAAV data sources neither explicitly nor implicitly 
acknowledge problems potentially emerging from or 
associated with the employment of an "evolutionary" 
acquisition strategy but supported by a "classical" 
test and evaluation (T&E) approach. The author views 
this subject as a thesis topic area warranting further 
research by NPS students. (Reference Attribute Sub- 
Categories- Acquisition Strategy, Testing, Data Sources 
2-4, 10, 11, 17). 
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• Several data sources discuss the function/criticality 
of program "stakeholders" to the future of the program. 
(Reference Attribute Sub-Categories- Risk Mitigation, 
Acquisition Strategy, Development and Design, Logistics 
Management, Data Sources 2-6, 10, 11, 15, 17). 
• Several AAAV program data sources examined discuss the 
function and criticality of both evaluating and 
applying, where appropriate, lessons learned from other 
acquisition programs, as well as sharing lessons 
learned with other programs. (Reference Attribute Sub- 
Categories- Risk Documentation, Development and Design, 
Testing, Modeling and Simulation, Contract Management, 
Logistics Management, Data Sources 1, 3, 12-14, 16). 
• AAAV program data sources identify S/W as a critical 
AAAV subsystem prone to rapid evolution. Risk 
associated with S/W design and development was assessed 
as moderate by the DRPM/AAAV. Unlike other technical 
risk areas, AAAV program data sources did not, however, 
recommend nor identify an explicit, detailed strategy 
to mitigate this risk area. The author views this 
topic as a thesis subject area warranting further 
research by subsequent NPS students. (Reference 
Attribute Sub-Categories- Development and Design, 
Software Development and Design, Data Sources 1, 2, 4) . 
K.  PRINCIPAL AREAS OF PROGRAM RISK 
1.  Overview 
Following a program overview, this section summarizes the 
principal areas of technical, supportability, cost, and 
schedule risk existing in the AAAV program. Risk areas are 
expressed in terms of functional areas. For each risk 
functional area identified, a rating assessment (Low, 
Moderate, or High) and a discussion of risk management and 
mitigation strategies and techniques employed by the DRPM is 
provided. Information in this section was derived principally 
from the risk management DSM for the AAAV Program, Appendix D. 
The DRPM/AAAV Integrated Program Summary (IPS) , and the Office 
of Advanced Technology (OAT) Technical Assessment for the AAAV 
(Matrix Data Sources 2 and 6) provided supplemental data 
required to develop the subsections which follow. 
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Definitions to ratings applied to each risk functional area 
are furnished in the Glossary of Terms, Appendix B. 
Prior to MS 0, a Technology Base program was conducted to 
demonstrate the feasibility of subsystems and technology areas 
identified as critical to the success of a self-deploying high 
water speed (HWS) amphibious vehicle. The Technology Base 
program took a dual path for technology studies and 
experiments (land mobility, water mobility) and integrated 
these efforts into the successful fabrication and testing of 
two different size (scale) technology demonstrators. 
During the land mobility portion of the Technology Base 
program, components and subsystems were fabricated and tested 
on fielded combat vehicles and on a 14 ton Automotive Test Rig 
(ATR) . The ATR was a slow water speed (SWS) amphibious 
vehicle which integrated a "drive-by-wire" computer control 
system, lightweight track, retractable hydropneumatic 
suspension, and a remote controlled, unmanned weapon station. 
The water mobility portion of the Technology Base program 
consisted of over 1,000 hours of hydrodynamic model tests to 
evaluate a variety of system concepts and configurations. 
Subsequent to this testing, a 0.5 scaled Hydrodynamic Test Rig 
(HTR) of a planing hull concept was fabricated and tested. 
The HTR confirmed it was possible to predict the hydrodynamic 
performance of a heavily loaded planing hull. The scaling 
procedures used in the 1/12, 1/8, and 1/6 scale tow basin 
models were validated by the 1/2 scale manned model. 
The two parallel paths were integrated by modifying the 
ATR to incorporate the hydrodynamic appendages, large power 
plant, and newly developed water jets into a fully amphibious, 
track laying, 17 ton HWS Technology Demonstrator (HWSTD) . The 
HWSTD validated performance predictions by exceeding 30 knots 
during over water testing. The next step was the design, 
fabrication and testing of a 29 ton, fully amphibious, track 
laying Propulsion Systems Demonstrator (PSD). 
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The PSD was fabricated using a composite hull and demonstrated 
established land and water mobility requirements. 
To reduce risks associated with the utilization of 
lightweight composite materials for the armor on combat 
vehicles, two composite hull M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier 
(APC) vehicles were designed and fabricated. Both vehicles 
completed a 600 hour hull durability test program. One of 
these vehicles was selected to continue testing and 
subsequently completed a 2,000 hour (20 year equivalent) 
durability test without structural failure. 
Since initiation of the CE/D phase, the AAAV program has 
focused efforts on identifying and reducing key risk drivers. 
After a competitive solicitation, conceptual design contracts 
were awarded to the GDLS and to the UDLP. During these 
conceptual study contracts, both contractors developed initial 
designs, conducted hydrodynamic model testing, developed and 
ballistically tested various armor schemes, and fabricated 
full-scale mockups of their respective concept. Upon 
conclusion of these contracts, several independent risk 
assessments were performed. 
The first risk assessment was performed by the Office of 
Naval Research (ONR) using staff scientists and independent 
specialty area consultants. This effort was concluded in July 
1991, and identified several continuing risk areas. One of 
these areas was the ability of available engine(s) to produce 
the required 2,600 horsepower for the AAAV application. This 
lead to an independent assessment conducted by Ricardo, 
Incorporated of available engine candidates. The result was 
the identification of an upgraded MTU 883 series diesel 
engine, a primary choice. 
At the same time the Marine Corps Operational Test and 
Evaluation Agency (MCOTEA) conducted EOAs on both contractors 
full-scale mockups. Subsequent to these independent 
assessments, both contractors were awarded risk-reduction 
37 
contracts to refine their concepts based on data collected. 
This included a requirement for an "open engine bay- 
architecture" design to ensure their design approach was 
independent to the success of any single engine candidate. 
Additionally, both contractors were permitted to pursue 
risk reducing projects of their own selection, coupled with a 
requirement to fabricate and test a large scale HTR. The HTRs 
were fabricated and testing was completed in 1993. 
Hydrodynamic Test Rigs varied in size from .75 to .80 scale. 
Both HTRs achieved water speed in excess of 3 0 knots, thus 
validating the technical feasibility of achieving the required 
water performance. 
Additional contract activity included hydrodynamic model 
testing, appendage actuation experiments, and continued 
ballistic testing of armor. Both contractors updated their 
full-scale mockups to reflect changes to their designs, and 
MCOTEA conducted a second EOA with the results provided to 
both contractors. [Ref. 7:p. 66] 
The ONR performed a second risk assessment in 1992, again 
using staff scientists and independent specialty area 
consultants. Their evaluation was concluded in November 1992, 
and determined that prior risk areas had been successfully 
addressed. ONR recommended that the AAAV program proceed into 
full-scale prototyping. 
In September 1993 contracts were awarded to UDLP and GDLS 
for the design, fabrication, and testing of a full scale ATR. 
Both contractors initiated fabrication of their ATRs and 
testing began during 1st QTR FY 95. Computer modeling and 
simulation has shown that both designs will possess the land 
mobility characteristics to match or exceed those of the Ml 
MBT. [Ref 6. pp: D-3-4] 
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2.  Technical Risks & Mitigation Strategy 
This Subsection identifies the principal areas of 
technical risk existing in the AAAV program and explains the 
mitigation methodologies adopted by the DRPM/AAAV for each 
risk area. 
• Hull- Risk Assessment- Low to Moderate- To reduce the 
risk associated with the development of the AAAV hull 
several actions have occurred. The Marine Corps has 
invested in technology development of lightweight 
armors, both composite and the more traditional 
metallic, to provide a solid base for hull development. 
Two full scale composite M-113 APC vehicles were built 
in 1985 and tested from 1985 to 1987. The Government 
PSD technology demonstrator used a composite hull, and 
the U.S. Army fabricated and tested a composite hull M- 
2 BFV for 6,000 miles. The DRPM/AAAV is maintaining 
contact with the Army's Composite Armored Vehicle 
program to ensure lessons learned are incorporated into 
the AAAV. Risk associated with the hull has been 
reduced as much as possible for this phase. Every 
aspect of hull performance is being analyzed and 
tested. Tests to date indicate required hull 
performance levels will be achieved. Failure during 
LFT&E is the primary schedule risk created by the hull. 
By investing in the Ballistic Hull and Turret (BH&T) 
planned for the D&V phase, this risk is reduced. The 
efforts associated with manufacturing complete hulls 
increase the knowledge of the producibility issues, 
thereby reducing cost risk. 
• Suspension- Risk Assessment- Low- Both competing 
contractors' designs use experience gained from 
previous and current development programs within DoD 
and, where appropriate, utilize commonality of 
components within the DoD military vehicle inventory. 
Development of suspension systems for tracked vehicles 
is not a new technology for military vehicle 
applications. Both competing contractors have 
previously developed and fielded military vehicles with 
suspension systems. Both competing contractors were 
awarded contracts in FY 93 to design, build, and test 
their AAAV retractable suspension systems on a full 
scale ATR which represents their AAAV design. 
Government testing of ATRs will be conducted at the 
Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) during the 2nd and 3rd 
QTRs of FY 95 to demonstrate that their systems are 
capable of operating with the Ml MBT. These tests will 
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be completed prior to the start of the D&V phase. The 
ATR contract also requires that both contractors 
design, build, and test their AAAV track. The track is 
to be tested during the suspension system test. These 
efforts reduce the risk associated with the AAAV 
suspension system and AAAV track development prior to 
the D&V phase. Lessons learned from ATR contract 
efforts will be applied in development of the D&V 
prototype suspension system. Additionally, the winning 
D&V contractor will use its ATR for testing and data 
collection which will further contribute to the 
maintenance of the overall program schedule. 
Propulsion- Risk Assessment- Moderate- Competing D&V 
contractors are required to maintain "an open engine 
bay architecture" as a design requirement. This 
approach ensures more than one candidate engine can be 
installed in the AAAV without incurring costly 
rearrangement of the internal vehicle subsystems and 
components. Alternative candidates under consideration 
are a single diesel engine, a rotary engine, and a 
diesel/turbine engine combination. The competing 
contractors are required to have a margin on thrust and 
weight to further minimize impact on the engine 
selected. To assess the risk associated with the 
engine, the DRPM used various agencies to evaluate 
viable candidates. These include both AAAV competing 
contractors, Ricardo, Inc., Naval Surface Warfare 
Center (NSWC) Annapolis, and the CNR. As a result of 
these analyses, competing AAAV contractors have 
selected a hybrid of the MTU 883 engine as their 
primary engine candidate. The winning D&V contractor 
will be required to identify both a primary and 
secondary engine choice and will be responsible for the 
primary engine maturation and qualification. The 
qualification of the vehicle's primary engine prior to 
MS II has been established as a MS I exit criteria. 
The qualification test will consist of a 400 hour NATO 
test and a 1,000 hour endurance and certification test 
to ensure the engine is qualified for production prior 
to MS II. 
Automotive Drive Train- Risk Assessment- Low- The AAAV 
automotive drive train will use a NDI, production based 
transmission. Both competing contractors conducted 
studies of their proposed propulsion systems and 
concluded that an existing NDI, production based 
transmission satisfies their design requirements. Both 
competing D&V contractors are using their primary 
transmission choice in their respective ATRs. Given 
the testing of the ATRs at APG, each contractor will 
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have an early indication as to whether its AAAV 
transmission performs adequately. Lessons learned from 
the transmission on the ATR will be applied to the 
development of the D&V prototype. 
Marine Drive Unit (MDU) - Risk Assessment- Low- Several 
tests and analyses have been conducted to lower risks 
associated with the MDU. Computer design and 
prediction techniques were developed at the NSWC- 
Carderock Division. These predictions have been 
validated by scale model testing. Large scale models 
of proposed MDU have been employed to propel both the 
Government's and contractors' HTRs in open ocean 
testing. This verification testing measured actual 
performance within three percent (3%) of modeling 
predictions. As this component involves the use of 
proven systems and known characteristics, it is 
assessed a low risk rating. 
Nuclear, Biological. Chemical (NBC)- Risk Assessment- 
Low- Protection for embarked Marines in an NBC 
contaminated environment is a core requirement of the 
AAAV. To meet this requirement, the AAAV will use an 
Advanced Filtration System (AFS) and an environmental 
control system. Technology for the AFS is being 
developed by the U.S. Army's Environmental Research, 
Development, and Engineering Command (ERDEC). 
Technology associated with the environmental control 
system is mature. Environmental Research, Development, 
and Engineering Command will install an AFS unit on the 
Government PSD to demonstrate system integration and 
environmental suitability. If ERDEC is unable to 
mature the AFS in time to field the AAAV, then an 
existing combat vehicle filtration system will be 
installed. The AAAV will maintain the capability to 
upgrade to an AFS. 
Weapon Station- Risk Assessment- Low- The AAAV Weapon 
Station is being developed from a long lineage of 
developmental and in-service designs. Due to the high 
rate of change in selected weapon station technologies, 
the system is being designed with attention to an open 
architecture. Using this approach, improvements may be 
incorporated into the turret as the system matures. 
Both competing contractors have performed conceptual 
design studies to examine several weapon station 
alternatives. The station will adapt components and 
subsystems developed for other combat vehicles. No new 
technology is being employed by the AAAV weapon 
station, therefore the risk is assessed as low by the 
DRPM. 
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• Communication/Navigation Equipment- Risk Assessment- 
Low- All radio systems and antennas used in the AAAV 
are currently employed by other fielded systems. All 
navigational, position location, and intercom systems 
in the AAAV will be in use during the timeframe. 
• Software Development- Risk Assessment- Moderate- The 
AAAV is a system that intends to employ the maximum 
amount of established components and developed software 
from previously fielded systems. The risks associated 
with the AAAV S/W development focuses on four major 
areas: 1) Requirements: The DRPM conducted several 
technology demonstrations during the CE/D phase to 
prove technology and mitigate risks. Although S/W was 
not the primary issue involved during these activities, 
S/W was implemented and provided benefits by its 
application; 2) Resource Constraints: The DRPM/AAAV 
must manage risks associated with uncertainties in 
resource estimating and test and support equipment. By 
employing a sound design methodology such as the Object 
Oriented Approach (00A), any S/W modification 
requirements will be more resilient to design changes; 
3) Development Approach: The criticality and 
complexity of the AAAV S/W mandates selection of a 
sound development approach. The ATR effort explained 
previously in this section has provided the DRPM/AAAV 
insight into each of the competing contractors S/W 
design process; and 4) Technology: Technological 
assessments relating to techniques, tools, or equipment 
utilized for the S/W development have occurred with 
each of the technology demonstration efforts described 
previously in this section. Lessons learned from these 
efforts will be applied during the AAAV development. 
• Land Mobility- Risk Assessment- Low- During the ATR 
contracts, both competing contractors used modeling and 
simulation programs to demonstrate that their AAAV can 
operate to requirement levels specified in the ORD 
[Ref. 8:p. 15].  Testing of the ATRs will be performed 
by the Government at the APG during 2nd and 3rd QTRs, 
FY 95 to demonstrate that each competing contractor's 
system is capable of operation with the Ml MBT, and to 
validate their modeling predictions. Accomplishment of 
these tests will be completed prior to the start of the 
D&V contract. Furthermore, the Government is 
conducting an independent modeling assessment using the 
NATO Reference Mobility Model. The purpose of this 
assessment is to confirm the contractors' prediction. 
Lessons learned from the ATRs will be applied in the 
development of the D&V prototype suspension system. 
Modeling and simulation will be updated accordingly. 
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The AAAV program intends to demonstrate land mobility- 
requirements prior to the D&V contract award. 
• Water Mobility- Risk Assessment- Low to Moderate- 
There is technical risk associated with integrating 
into a single AAAV, the three primary components 
(vehicle weight, available power, efficiency of 
transferring power into thrust) required to produce 
high water speed. To mitigate risk associated with 
water mobility, a variety of tests and analyses have 
been performed. Several small scale hydrodynamic tests 
have been performed. Two large scale technology 
demonstrators have been constructed and employed in the 
Marine Corps' Technology Base program. Each competing 
prime contractor constructed large scale HTRs to 
demonstrate the capability of its technical approach. 
The successful demonstration of the high water speed 
requirement by these technology demonstrators has 
significantly reduced the risk in this core area. 
• Weight Control- Risk Assessment- Moderate- Weight 
control or weight growth has been an area of moderate 
risk for all combat systems during both development and 
production. The AAAV program has taken the following 
four actions to minimize risk in AAAV weight growth: 1) 
Independent weight growth assessments of each competing 
prime contractor's design to isolate and resolve 
differences between the independent weight estimate and 
the contractor's estimate; 2) Application of a five 
percent (5%) weight margin by each competing prime 
contractor on its AAAV design in an empty configuration 
to permit the factor of uncertainty in vehicle weight 
estimating; 3) Requirement for each competing prime 
contractor to establish a permanent weight control and 
reduction program; and 4) Requirement for each 
competing prime contractor to assign component and 
subsystem weight as a heavily weighted criterion during 
all trade-off analyses. [Ref. 7:pp. 17, 35] 
• Test and Evaluation (T&E) - Risk Assessment- Low to 
Moderate-There is low to moderate risk associated with 
the AAAV program T&E effort. Adequate time is 
scheduled for the retest, redesign, and evaluation of 
all test results. The highest maintenance item for the 
AAAV is the suspension system, and the ATR is designed 
primarily as a suspension test bed. The ATR will 
operate during the D&V phase to acquire test data on 
suspension, final drive, hull form, stowed appendage 
robustness, and ride quality. The AAAV suspension 
system will incorporate selected NDI suspension 
subsystems and components.   Integration of these 
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components into the ATR and the continuous operation of 
the ATR during the D&V phase reduces schedule and 
technical performance risk of the D&V prototype. An 
HTR will also be operated as a test bed during the D&V 
phase. The HTR enables early comprehension of design 
changes in a field environment and reduces the impact 
of design modifications on the overall D&V schedule and 
prototype test phase. A BH&T will be delivered during 
the D&V phase. The testing of the BH&T provides a high 
level of confidence in the armor solution built for the 
D&V prototype. If deficiencies are discovered by this 
testing, sufficient time is available to alter the 
design and incorporate changes into the D&V prototype. 
Two production representative vehicles produced during 
EMD will be used for LFT&E. Two mockups (one 
non-functional and one functional) of the AAAV(C) will 
be constructed. The functional mockup is transportable 
and will be used in a mobile field environment to 
identify command and control problems. Additionally, 
the communication suite of the AAAV(C) will be 
installed in the ATR during D&V. These test articles 
allow for evaluation of the command and communication 
suite, human factors, systems integration, power 
requirements, potential interference between the 
electronic subsystems, and software issues. All 
previously discussed activities will be completed prior 
to integrating AAAV(C) hardware and software items into 
a AAAV prototype. The area where moderate risk exists 
in the D&V test schedule is the availability of a 
single prototype. The scope and depth of data 
collected during D&V could be limited by the presence 
of only one prototype. A catastrophic loss of the 
prototype could substantially and adversely impact on 
the program. While this is unlikely, it is an issue 
that increases risk in the T&E area. 
• Systems Integration- Risk Assessment- Moderate- The 
final AAAV design will incorporate many technologies, 
systems, and subsystems required to meet littoral 
region land and water requirements as a total system. 
Many subsystems and components proposed by AAAV 
contractors in their conceptual designs exist and have 
been proven on other U.S. combat vehicle systems. 
Examining these subsystems and technologies 
independently, an assessment of "Low" risk may he 
obtained. However, regardless of the number of NDI 
subsystems and technologies in the AAAV, this will be 
the first time these items and technologies will have 
been integrated to perform together in this unique 
environment. Furthermore, certain systems integration 
factors, such as weight control, center of gravity 
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control, interior space and volume control, exterior 
hull form design, hydrodynamics, and their 
interrelationships become critical to a vehicle design. 
To mitigate risk associated with AAAV systems 
integration, the Marine Corps required the contractors 
to weigh heavily the critical systems integration 
issues in every AAAV design and trade-off analysis 
performed during the concept phase and to continue to 
do so in the D&V phase. Additionally, specific system 
integration risk-reducing activities have been 
conducted. These activities include: 1) fabrication 
and Government user evaluation of full-scale AAAV 
mockups that included all major subsystems and their 
removal and maintenance paths; 2) use of sophisticated 
three dimensional solid models for analysis of systems 
integration, operability and maintainability; 3) 
fabrication and testing of near-full-scale amphibious 
vehicle technology demonstrators similar in design to 
contractor conceptual AAAV designs; 4) full-scale 
operational hydrodynamic appendage integration and 
testing for evaluation of hydrodynamic subsystem 
complexity; 5) S/W versus H/W trade-offs and resulting 
S/W rapid prototyping and testing; and 6) weight 
control programs and independent weight assessments of 
conceptual AAAV designs. [Ref. 6:p. D-15-16] 
3.  Supportability Risks & Mitigation Strategy 
Supportability and Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) 
management is considered low risk because the program has been 
continuing to define and direct supportability risk reduction 
from the initial contractual efforts. Management effort is 
focused on ensuring design contractors comprehend the 
complexity of support in the intended operational environment. 
Using existing support methodologies, the DRPM directed early 
identification of high cost drivers and high maintenance 
items, and required the contractors to examine more cost 
effective alternatives for achieving the desired technical 
objectives. The following paragraphs identify the principal 
areas of supportability risk existing in the AAAV program and 
explain the mitigation actions taken to date by the DRPM/AAAV 
for each risk area: 
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• Life Cycle Support- The DRPM is addressing risks 
associated with life cycle support of the AAAV. 
Actions taken by the DRPM have identified the high Life 
Cycle Cost (LCC) drivers and investigated alternatives 
to achieving required support within budgetary 
constraints. The program's initial concern was the 
early identification of the high cost drivers. 
Normally, during the early stages of a program the 
focus is on achieving the system's technical 
performance requirements. To counterbalance this, the 
DRPM has required the competing contractors to use the 
Equipment Designers Cost Analysis System (EDCAS) during 
the AAAV design process. The Equipment Designers Cost 
Analysis System is a software model that permits 
isolation of high cost drivers concurrently in the 
engineering design process. Reliability and 
maintainability parameters were also input for each 
design into the EDCAS model. The contractors were 
required to address the data and results of the EDCAS 
analyses as part of their conceptual design reports. 
When Operations and Support (O&S) issues were not 
addressed in the decision process, the contractors were 
required to reassess their design using required 
parameters. 
• Design Rules- The DRPM capitalized on lessons learned 
from other weapon system acquisition programs in the 
area of supportability. Understanding that the 
maintenance of complex weapon systems is a high cost 
driver, the DRPM identified ways to minimize the impact 
of the system on the overall Marine Corps maintenance 
structure. The Marine Corps developed Design Rules 
which have been provided to the design contractors. 
Design Rules focus on risk mitigation in terms of 
designing maintainability into the AAAV during early 
design stages. Competing contractors are required to 
use and report achievement of these design rules at the 
system, subsystem, and piece part levels. By requiring 
the designers to comply with these design rules or 
lessons learned, the DRPM will reduce the maintenance 
burden of the AAAV and reduce effect O&S costs. 
Presently, 26 design rules are in effect to reduce 
maintenance workload, personnel skill requirements, and 
limit the growth of special tools and test equipment. 
• Partitioning- In conjunction with the Design Rules and 
EDCAS modeling, the DRPM also required the contractors 
to perform partitioning analyses on their designs. The 
focus of the partitioning analysis is to identify 
subsystems and components where lower costs during the 
O&S phase can be realized by reducing manpower, 
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personnel and training, spare and repair parts, 
transportation costs, and test equipment. Partitioning 
also focuses on separating low-service life components 
into unique groupings to reduce maintenance times 
required for servicing. 
• RAM-D- The DRPM structured a test schedule which uses 
a conservative vehicle hours per month requirement to 
ensure attainment of critical reliability testing. 
This conservative estimate of less than 24 vehicle 
hours per month ensures that AAAV prototypes will have 
the opportunity to achieve the hours required to 
support the AAAV Reliability Program. The suspension 
system has been identified as a potential RAM risk 
driver. Automotive Test Rigs are under construction by 
the competing contractors in an effort to design, 
build, and test their objective AAAV suspension system. 
This effort reduces RAM risk associated with the 
suspension system. Additionally, a Failure Mode 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on the ATRs 
has been required to identify early failures and their 
systemic impacts. 
• Maintainability- To positively influence the life 
cycle support of the AAAV, contractors have been 
required to assess maintainability aspects of their 
designs. The Marine Corps conducted maintainability 
and diagnostics demonstrations on each conceptual 
design. These demonstrations were conducted as both 
computer simulations and physical demonstrations 
utilizing full-scale vehicle mockups. 
• Human Systems Integration (HSI)- With the use of JACK 
Human Factors Modeling and Supercard Rapid Prototyping 
simulations, the location and types of controls and 
displays were developed. JACK Human Factors modeling 
combined with other simulation was utilized to evaluate 
driver visibility in land and water plane intercepts. 
The results were changes to the vehicle's hull 
configuration for improved visibility. 
• Modeling and Simulation (M&S)- The objective for use 
of M&S is to accelerate development and reduce 
technical and cost risks. One specific goal is to 
reduce the number of prototypes while meeting all T&E 
requirements in the TEMP [Ref. 9] . To accomplish these 
goals, the AAAV M&S plan focuses on using emerging 
technologies in Distributed Interactive Simulation 
(DIS).  By using common simulations, standard data 
bases, and reconfigurable technology common to other 
Services, the Marine Corps is ensuring compatibility 
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with ongoing DoD efforts. The result is a M&S 
capability developed and validated by Joint Service 
efforts which can be applied early in the development 
phase of the AAAV design. The Marine Corps' ability to 
introduce design changes into a simulated environment 
enhances operational suitability of the end item, 
allows for user evaluation, and produces a more combat 
effective system with less risk. [Ref. 6:p. D-15] 
4.  Cost Risks & Mitigation Strategy 
Based on the conservative choice of technologies, 
estimating techniques, and the nature of the items estimated, 
cost risk is viewed as low to moderate. 
The present Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) was preceded 
by several cost estimating activities including estimates for 
material alternatives to the AAAV and estimates by the two 
competing prime contractors both for a "streamlined" AAAV 
program and the present baseline schedule. 
The final LCCE reflects conservative technical choices. 
Where a question existed regarding technology to be 
incorporated into the AAAV, the LCCE includes the more 
expensive technology. For example, the LCCE included a 
composite hull, even though one of the competing contractors 
indicated it will use a less expensive aluminum hull. The 
following estimating techniques were used for the final LCCE: 
• Actuals from the Ml MBT, BFV, PSD, and other similar 
development and production programs. 
• Quotes and purchase histories for developed components 
or NDI components. 
• Historical levels of effort in areas as Program Office 
operations and O&S costs. 
Most elements of the LCCE reflect existing or developed 
technologies (e.g., Communication and Navigation equipment). 
Elements including developmental items (e.g., engine) were 
conservatively estimated. A risk analysis was included in the 
LCCE.  The analysis employed Monte Carlo simulation. 
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The final estimate for each program phase was the risk 
analysis output at the 90% confidence level. [Ref. 6:p. D-17] 
5.  Schedule Risks & Mitigation Strategy 
The following paragraphs identify the principal areas of 
schedule risk existing for each phase in the AAAV program and 
explains the mitigation actions planned by the DRPM/AAAV for 
each risk area: 
• Demonstration & Validation Phase- Risk Assessment- Low- 
The level of technical maturity of the AAAV program is 
exceptional for transition of MS I. As previously 
discussed, the Technical Base program and contractor 
projects conducted during the CE/D phase raised the 
level of maturity substantially. The schedule allows 
for 16 month fabrication phase, six months for combined 
shakeout/acceptance tests, eight months for DT-I, one 
month for refurbishment, and three months for OT-I. 
The eight month DT-I tests have been scheduled to 
accommodate prevailing ocean weather patterns at the 
test site. Test rates are taken from testing conducted 
at both APG and the Amphibian Vehicle Test Directorate 
(AVTD), Camp Pendleton, California. All required test 
and data reduction time requested by the independent 
testers has been included. 
• Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase & Low 
Rate Initial Production- Risk Assessment- Low- Sixty 
Nine months are allotted for the combination of EMD and 
LRIP. Twenty Four months are provided to incorporate 
changes identified during D&V phase testing. Nine 
months are allotted for combined shakeout/acceptance 
testing of the 11 prototypes. Twenty Three months are 
scheduled for DT-II testing, with a three month 
refurbishment before the IOT&E tests. Low Rate Initial 
Production award will not be made until 17 months of 
total testing has been completed. Twelve months are 
provided for the conduct of LFTE, and nine months for 
data reduction and reporting prior to the FRP MS. Upon 
award of the LRIP contract, 18 months are provided 
before delivery of the first LRIP vehicles. Low Rate 
Initial Production will produce 101 vehicles from an 
initial rate of two per month, or six per quarter, to 
the FRP rate of 50 per quarter. This rate increase 
will occur over a period of 28 months. The FRP rate is 
well below the maximum capacity of both contractors. 
[Ref. 6:pp. D-18-19] 
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L.  SUMMARY 
This chapter accomplished two major objectives. First, 
an explication of the AAAV program's historical development, 
current status and acquisition strategy was provided. Second, 
a chronicle of the risk management and mitigation strategies 
and techniques applied, on-going, and planned for the 
principal areas of risk identified in the AAAV literature data 
sources reviewed was furnished. 
The product of the program documentation and literature 
review process is represented in the DSM for the AAAV Program, 
Appendix D. Specific risk management strategies and 
techniques are categorized and profiled as risk attributes in 
this matrix. As in Chapter II, Literature Review, the matrix 
technique used in this chapter provided the mechanism or 
vehicle to extract detailed information from numerous data 
sources. Application of this information gathering and 
organization technique can directly assist a PM or acquisition 
professional involved in the process of developing, 
comprehending, or improving their respective risk management 
program. 
In Chapter IV, Analysis of Risk Management Methodologies, 
a comparative analysis of methodologies recommended in or 
prescribed by the risk management BOK with strategies and 
techniques described by AAAV program documentation will be 
conducted. The analysis draws upon data profiled in both DSMs 
(Appendices C and D) , reconciles the specific risk management 
attributes contained in each domain, points out areas of 
convergence and divergence, and evaluates elements of the 
Spiral Model which show merit for application within the AAAV 
acquisition program. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS OF RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to perform a comparative 
analysis of risk management methodologies employed in the AAAV 
acquisition program to methodologies contained in the risk 
management BOK. The analysis unifies and elaborates findings 
delivered in Section E of Chapter II and Section J of Chapter 
III. 
This objective will be accomplished in three phases. 
First, Section B illustrates the extent to which the 
methodology implemented in the AAAV program merges with the 
methodology contained in the risk management BOK. Second, 
Section C examines the extent to which the AAAV programs' 
methodology diverges from the methodology contained in the 
risk management BOK. The relationship between these two 
domains is depicted pictorially in Figure 2 below. Finally, 
an evaluation of the Spiral Model's operational functions and 
primary features (attributes) which merit application in the 
AAAV program is presented in Section D. 
Figure 2.  Pictorial Representation of Domain Relationships 
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B.  AREAS WHERE RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES CONVERGE 
A comparative analysis between the two risk management 
methodologies reveals several notable areas of similar intent, 
purpose, and function. Areas of similarity or convergence 
between these two domains are derived from the respective risk 
management DSMs (Appendices C and D) . The reader's attention 
to these matrices is invited. 
Areas of convergence appear collectively at the sub- 
category level and individually at the risk attribute element 
level within a sub-category.  The following subsections 
provide an analysis of 15 areas where attribute sub-categories 
and risk attributes converge between the two domains. 
1. Risk Definitions 
The risk management BOK provides definitions for numerous 
risk management terms and concepts. A subset of these 
definitions includes definitions to risk terms which function 
to qualify or rate specific technical risk factors. These 
terms include; Low Risk, Medium/Moderate Risk, and High Risk. 
The DRPM's risk management plan and methodology likewise 
furnishes definitions to terms which qualifying and rate risk 
areas. 
2. Risk Management Planning 
The risk management BOK requires the PM to establish a 
risk management plan. The risk management plan must 
incorporate a risk rating scheme and identify the frequency of 
risk analyses performed. Examination of the risk management 
DSM for the AAAV program (Appendix D) reveals that the DRPM 
has established a viable risk management plan. The DRPM's 
plan provides activities to be assessed during each program 
phase and at each MS decision. 
3. Risk Assessment 
The risk management BOK offers several strategies, 
techniques, and sources to be used in assessing program risks. 
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Particular emphasis is given to the assessment of technical 
risks. The risk management DSM for the AAAV program 
identifies eight risk areas targeted by the DRPM for continued 
risk assessment and evaluation. Further, the DSM discloses 
that a major technical risk assessment was performed on the 
Stratified Charge Rotary Engine (SCRE) for the AAAV. 
4. Risk Analysis 
The risk management BOK provides several methods to be 
used in examining, evaluating, and quantifying risk areas 
identified in a program. These methods include: 1) risk 
scoring/rating; 2) FMECA; 3) LCC Models and Estimates; 4) 
Monte Carlo simulation; and 5) Level of Repair Analysis. The 
DRPM's risk management methodology incorporated each of the 
five methods indicated above. 
5. Risk Documentation 
The risk management BOK identifies end user and customer 
participation early in the risk documentation process as 
paramount to a program's risk management effort. Furthermore, 
efforts to develop a historical database and to archive risk 
information are encouraged by the risk management BOK. The 
DRPM/AAAV placed these principles into practice by involving 
O&M personnel from active Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units in 
the risk documentation process. Fleet Marine Force personnel 
have and are actively participating in the commenting on and 
assessment of technical, safety, training, maintenance, and 
human factors issues in the AAAV development and design 
effort. Further, the DRPM has entered the results of risk 
analyses, technical data, and hardware configurations into the 
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) database. 
6. Risk Mitigation 
Risk mitigation techniques and strategies contained in 
the risk management BOK focus on technical risk areas.  Risk 
mitigation techniques from the BOK include: 1) simulations; 2) 
use of component and full scale tests; 3) use of mock-ups; 
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4) logistics and maintainability demonstrations; 5) internal 
contractor reviews; and 6) identification of manufacturing and 
producibility issues and risks associated with design concepts 
and efforts to reduce them. 
A cornerstone of the DRPM's risk mitigation effort has 
been the Technology Base program. The Technology Base program 
incorporated all of the above listed risk mitigation 
techniques and strategies. The program targeted high risk 
drivers of affordability, performance, and the known core 
operational requirements for early development and for the 
purpose of demonstrating the technical feasibility of HWS 
amphibious vehicles. The program was used as a springboard 
for more detailed development work during the CE/D phase. 
Several risk reducing experiments have and continue to be 
performed by the DRPM office in concert with the two competing 
prime contractors (UDLP and GDLS). These risk reducing 
experiments include: 1) tests of major components and 
subsystems; 2) full scale vehicle mockups and tests; 3) 
ballistics and armor reparability tests; 4) construction and 
testing of contractor .75 and .80 scale HWS HTRs; and 5) M&S. 
7.  Risk Areas 
In accordance with the risk management BOK, the DRPM has 
identified, categorized, and rated all major sources of 
program risk. Additionally, cost and technical risk areas and 
uncertainties existing or anticipated for each program phase 
have been identified. 
Mitigation strategies and techniques to address each 
major risk area have been formulated or are being implemented 
by the DRPM. Major technical risk areas identified by the 
DRPM include: hull, suspension, propulsion, automotive drive 
train, marine drive unit, NBC, weapon station, communication 
and navigation equipment, S/W development, land and water 
mobility, weight control, test and evaluation, system 
integration, supportability, cost, and schedule. 
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8. Acquisition Strategy Considerations 
In accordance with the risk management BOK, the DRPM has 
considered and selected an alternative and evolutionary- 
acquisition strategy. The DRPM's strategy is entitled the 
"Paradigm Shift Model". Additionally, tailoring of the number 
of program phases and decision points as required by the risk 
management BOK to meet the unique needs of the AAAV program, 
has been accomplished. The tailoring activity was based upon 
program risks and supports the DRPM's overall risk management 
plan. 
9. Development & Design Considerations 
The risk management BOK asserts that accelerating a 
system development delays design maturation. As a result, 
numerous configuration changes can occur later in the program. 
An examination of the risk management methodology for the AAAV 
program reveals that the DRPM remains cognizant of this 
potential source of risk and has crafted an appropriate 
acquisition strategy. The DRPM's strategy incorporates the 
following eight major risk mitigation measures to support the 
AAAV development and design effort: 1) use of common 
subsystems and components in all AAAV mission role variants to 
the maximum extent possible; 2) plan for future upgrades in 
acquisition process; 3) application of "open architecture" and 
partitioned design to allow for significant growth or complete 
change-out of subsystems prone to rapid evolution or those 
that represent critical risk; 4) system design to design-in 
space, weight, power claims, channels, hard points, etc, to 
accommodate leap ahead, mature, and proven technologies 
infused from the DoD Science and Technology Thrust Areas; 5) 
establishment of development and in-service margins; 6) 
contractors' performance of concurrent engineering; 7) use of 
expert resources at the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command 
(TACOM), specifically in land mobility and survivability, to 
assist in conceptual design of the AAAV; and 8) use of 
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available COTS and low developmental or NDI components that 
have been ruggedized whenever possible. 
10. Software Development & Design Considerations 
As specified and recommended in the risk management BOK, 
the DRPM's risk management methodology also incorporates the 
following   risk  management/mitigation   strategies   and 
techniques: 1) use of Ada programming language for subsystems 
and Line Reparable Units (LRUs) that use microcomputers; 2) 
development and delivery of non-proprietary S/W documentation 
and source code; 3) contractor delivery of all S/W support 
tools and associated documentation necessary to maintain and 
upgrade S/W after system is deployed;  4)  definition of 
interrelationships between H/W and S/W; 5) finalization of 
system  level  requirements  through  engineering  studies, 
technology proving experiments, trade-off and optimization 
analyses; 6) prototyping, simulation and modeling; 7) joint 
involvement of user and developer in reviewing program status, 
products, risks, and plans for the next stage; 8) elimination 
of unattractive alternatives early and inexpensively in 
program acquisition cycle through down-select to a single 
contractor is a D&V phase acquisition activity; and 9) 
tailoring of acquisition strategy based upon risks and the 
risk management plan. 
11. Prototyping & Technology Demonstration 
The risk management BOK requires that PMs conduct 
technology  demonstrations  and  aggressive  prototyping 
(including manufacturing processes, H/W and S/W systems, and 
critical  subsystems)  coupled  with  EOAs.    Competitive 
prototyping of critical systems is also recommended. 
For the AAAV program, advanced technologies were 
developed for every vehicle subsystem. Subsystems were 
systematically integrated and tested in a series of 
successively more complex operational demonstrators including 
a .55 scale HWS model, and a .75 scale PSD. 
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Full-scale prototype development and testing of the HWS 
vehicles are necessary and planned to resolve principal areas 
of technical risk. Fabrication and testing of sub-scale 
components have been accomplished. This has allowed the 
incorporation of more refined concepts into the D&V detailed 
design effort with less risk. Additionally, use of ATRs as a 
risk reducing activity is planned. This activity will 
identify high risk drivers and will facilitate evaluation of 
the first generation AAAV track and suspension components. 
Both competing prime contractors are developing and will 
produce prototypes early in the acquisition process (D&V). 
The D&V prototype will be used to reduce program risk through 
determination of technical deficiencies in subsystems and in 
operational modes that will be corrected in the EMD phase. 
12.  Testing Considerations 
The risk management BOK identifies the following testing 
methodologies, strategies, and techniques as critical to a 
program's risk management and mitigation effort. The DRPM's 
risk management methodology contains the same attributes: 1) 
combining DT and OT where feasible and practical; 2) 
identification of specific testing activities to be 
accomplished during each acquisition phase; 3) use of 
simulation and modeling by the contractor and the development 
agency to demonstrate and assess capabilities of key 
subsystems and components; 4) use of studies, simulations, 
analyses, and test data to explore and evaluate alternative 
concepts proposed; and 5) use of private testing laboratories 
and facilities if scheduling conflicts arise or cost or 
schedule savings to the Government can be realized. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, Section J, Subsection 2, 
AAAV  data  sources  neither  explicitly  nor  implicitly 
acknowledge problems potentially emerging from or associated 
with the employment of an "evolutionary" acquisition strategy 
but supported by a "classical" test and evaluation (T&E) 
57 
approach.  The author views this issue as a thesis topic area 
warranting further research by NPS students. 
13. Contract Management 
The risk management BOK identifies contract management 
considerations as attributes of a viable risk management 
program. The DRPM's risk management methodology contains the 
same attributes: 1) early identification of contractual 
requirements; 2) early competitive award as risk reducing 
technique; 3) consideration of NDI and COTS subsystems and 
components; 4) require competing contractors to identify, 
assess, and eliminate risk areas or reduce them to acceptable 
levels; 5) increase Government attention to subcontractor 
activities as risk reducing method; 6) consideration of 
combined procurement of end items, spares, and repair parts; 
7) contract provisions for material support (GFE and 
assistance in tooling and test equipment development); 8) 
ensure compliance with DoD priority designation system; 9) 
encourage stable system design; 10) D&V contract to maximize 
subcontracting competition, using the "Competition in 
Subcontracting Clause" (FAR 52.244-5); and 11) planning for a 
component breakout review once a D&V contractor is selected. 
14. Cost & Budgeting Considerations 
The risk management BOK provides the PM techniques for 
managing and mitigating cost and budgeting risks. Techniques 
identified in the risk management BOK which have also been 
employed by the DRPM/AAAV include: 1) early identification and 
management of cost drivers which have significant impact on 
readiness; 2) early isolation of LCCs; 3) performance of 
trade-off analyses involving leading cost drivers; 4) Monte 
Carlo simulation; 5) LCC modeling; and 6) estimating 
relationships (actuals from the Ml MBT, BFV, PSD, and other 
similar development and production programs). 
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15.  Logistics Management 
The risk management BOK provides several techniques for 
managing and mitigating supportability/ILS risks. Techniques 
recommended in the risk management BOK which have been and 
continue to be employed by the DRPM/AAAV include: 1) use of DT 
to initially assess maintainability/logistics supportability; 
2) use of LSA and level of repair analysis programs early in 
the acquisition process to validate AAAV provisioning 
objective (this activity continues through the FRP and 
deployment phase); 3) identification of the number of 
operational and support personnel, facilities, and 
organizational, intermediate, and depot support elements that 
must be in place to support IOC and FOC as early in the 
development process as possible; 4) identification, 
assessment, and analysis of supportability risks; and 5) 
logistics and maintainability demonstrations to enable 
incorporation of these concerns into the system design. 
C.  AREAS WHERE RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES DIVERGE 
A comparative analysis between the two risk management 
methodologies also reveals several areas of dissimilar intent, 
purpose, and function. Areas of dissimilarity or divergence 
between these two domains are derived from the respective risk 
management DSMs (Appendices C and D) . The reader's attention 
to these matrices is invited. 
Areas of divergence appear collectively at the sub- 
category level and individually at the risk attribute element 
level within a sub-category. The following subsections 
identify, and provide a detailed analysis of: 1) five distinct 
risk attribute sub-categories explicitly profiled in the risk 
management BOK which are not similarly profiled in the AAAV 
program methodology; and 2) two distinct risk attribute sub- 
categories explicitly profiled in the AAAV program methodology 
which are not similarly profiled in the risk management BOK. 
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1.  Risk Management Concepts 
This area of divergence represents a distinct sub- 
category of risk attributes profiled in the risk management 
BOK (Appendix C) not similarly profiled in the AAAV program 
risk management methodology (Appendix D) . Instead, attributes 
of this sub-category are disseminated to, subordinated to, and 
thus profiled within other attribute sub-categories of the 
AAAV program's methodology. 
The following comments illustrate this observation: 1) 
the risk management BOK offers two perspectives of the risk 
management process: short term and long term. This 
perspective is not explicitly articulated in the risk 
management methodology for the AAAV program (Appendix D) . 
This perspective is, however, implied and discernible from the 
risk mitigation activities implemented or planned by the 
DRPM/AAAV; and 2) the risk management BOK explicitly 
recommends management of risks associated with four areas of 
a program's environment (i.e., external risks). These areas 
include; external influences, interfaces, project 
stakeholders, and public relations programs. 
The risk management methodology for the AAAV program 
acknowledges these facets of the program's environment but 
does not identify the specific risk mitigation techniques to 
be applied nor reveal the elements of a broader, unifying risk 
management strategy aimed at addressing external risk areas. 
This is attributable to the lack of explicit or implicit 
policy and guidance from the DoD regarding the identification, 
assessment, analysis, and mitigation of external risks. 
2.  Risk Assessment 
An attribute of this sub-category of the risk management 
BOK DSM explicitly recommends that PMs provide focused 
training to personnel involved in risk assessment activities. 
The risk management DSM for the AAAV program (Appendix D) did 
not similarly profile this attribute. 
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3. Risk Identification 
As in the area of "Risk Management Concepts", this area 
of divergence represents a distinct sub-category of risk 
attributes resident in each domain but in differing forms. 
The risk identification process presented in the risk 
management BOK (Appendix C) recommends various techniques for 
the PM to use in gaining information relating to program 
risks. These techniques include; expert interviews, 
independent technical assessments, sources of objective 
information, and in-house design reviews. 
The risk management methodology for the AAAV program 
contains many of the same methods but under different risk 
attribute sub-categories. For example; the DRPM's conduct of 
in-house/in-process reviews is profiled as a risk attribute of 
the "Risk Management Planning" sub-category. Additionally, 
the DRPM's application of independent technical assessments 
[Ref. 11] is profiled as a risk attribute of the "Risk 
Assessment" sub-category. 
4. Manufacturing Considerations 
The risk management BOK: 1) defines the concept of 
"Manufacturing Risk Assessment"; 2) makes differentiations 
between categories of manufacturing processes and materials; 
and 3) requires the demonstration of experimental material in 
the factory prior to a demonstration in the manufacturing 
environment. 
These manufacturing considerations relate to activities 
commensurate with the EMD and later phases of the acquisition 
process and are currently not explicitly profiled in the risk 
management methodology for the AAAV program (Appendix D) . 
This divergency is, however, attributed to the fact that the 
AAAV program is in the CE/D phase and is consequently not 
engaged in manufacturing processes nor in risk mitigation 
activities associated with manufacturing processes. 
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5. Schedule Considerations 
The risk management BOK: 1) identifies the program 
schedule as subject to trade-off as a method of mitigating 
risk; and 2) recommends the PM employ the network schedule to 
identify deployment activities. 
These program schedule considerations relate to 
activities commensurate with the EMD and later phases of the 
acquisition process and are currently not profiled in the risk 
management methodology for the AAAV program (Appendix D) . As 
in "Manufacturing Considerations", this divergency is 
attributed to the fact that the AAAV program is in the CE/D 
phase and is, therefore, not actively engaged in detailed 
process scheduling, manufacturing activities, nor system 
deployment activities. 
6. Warranty Considerations 
The risk management BOK: 1) identifies warranty risk 
items; 2) suggests techniques for minimizing warranty risks; 
and 3) recommends that warranty considerations be integrated 
by the PM into the program's acquisition strategy. The 
author's examination of the AAAV program risk management 
methodology did not detect a similar explicit presentation nor 
formal acknowledgement of warranty considerations appropriate 
for a program in the CE/D phase. 
7. Modeling & Simulation 
A fundamental purpose of M&S for the DoD is to "test" 
what benefits technology can bring in buying weapon systems 
[Ref. 12]. An examination of the risk management BOK reveals 
that M&S techniques are presented as risk attributes within 
the Test and Evaluation (T&E) attribute sub-category. This 
presentation differs substantially from the AAAV program's 
treatment and presentation of M&S techniques. 
For the AAAV program, the DRPM is aggressively employing 
M&S as a major and distinct risk management initiative 
complementary but not subordinate to the DRPM's T&E effort. 
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Specifically, the DRPM/AAAV has elevated M&S and is allocating 
special resources to address three objectives: 1) What can M&S 
bring to the AAAV acquisition process?; 2) Will M&S technology 
produce cost savings for the AAAV acquisition program?; and 3) 
Can simulation systems acquired for testing also be used for 
training?. 
To facilitate the study of these objectives, the AAAV 
program office has teamed with and is receiving funding and 
technical support from the Defense Modeling and Simulation 
Office (DMSO) . Additionally, both competing prime contractors 
will make extensive use of advanced computer modeling and 
simulation. Together, the DRPM and DMSO intend to use the 
AAAV program as a test case for M&S with lessons learned to be 
shared with other military Services. The author views this 
topic as a subject area warranting future research by 
subsequent thesis students. 
8.  Systems Integration 
An analysis of the risk management BOK reveals that 
systems integration attributes are subsumed and/or 
subordinated within other risk attribute sub-categories. For 
example, the attribute sub-category "Risk Analysis" identifies 
Human Factors Analysis as an example of a risk analysis 
method. Other examples of this subordinating tendency abound. 
The AAAV program risk management methodology treatment 
and classification of systems integration issues differs 
markedly. The usual parameters within which a PM operates are 
performance, cost, and schedule. Since degradation in the 
Human Systems Integration (HSI) domains will adversely impact 
system performance and LCC, the decision was made to design 
the AAAV to meet the threat while recognizing the capabilities 
and limitations of the intended users. 
To decrease overall risk in the AAAV program, HSI has 
been designated by the DRPM as an additional parameter and as 
such became a separate risk management initiative. 
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The DRPM's methodology discloses that HSI has been elevated to 
a separate functional discipline area within the AAAV program 
office structure. The AAAV/HSI section has been tasked by the 
DRPM with: 1) using DoD HSI methodology to determine Manpower, 
Personnel, Training, Human Factors Engineering, Safety and 
Health Hazards requirements; and 2) the objective to reduce 
manpower requirements for operators and maintainers below that 
currently required to support the AAV7A1. 
Of paramount importance to the DRPM is the integration of 
human factors for environmental cooling systems for the crew 
and passengers into the conceptual design for the new AAAV. 
The DRPM' s risk management strategy acknowledges the potential 
risk associated with the limited operational effectiveness, 
costly modifications, and understated cost estimates if human 
factors for this feature are omitted from the AAAV design. 
[Ref. 13] The author also views this topic as a subject area 
warranting future research by subsequent thesis students. 
D.  ANALYSIS OF THE "SPIRAL MODEL" 
1.  Overview 
A subsidiary research question of this thesis asks 
whether the "Spiral Model of Software Development and 
Enhancement," as developed and presented by Barry W. Boehm of 
the Defense Systems Group, TRW Corporation, can be applied in 
non-software development efforts such as the AAAV program. 
This research question is evaluated with respect to the 
model's risk attributes in two areas. First, Subsection 2 
explains the model's operational functions and discusses 
operational attributes which merit application to the AAAV 
program. Second, Subsection 3 explains the model's primary 
features and identifies those attributes which merit 
application in the AAAV program. To demonstrate attributes of 
the Spiral Model that converge with and/or diverge from the 
AAAV  program  risk  management  methodology,  information 
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presented in: 1) Chapter III, The Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle Program; 2) Appendix D, DSM for the AAAV Program; and 
3) earlier in this chapter; will be referenced periodically to 
ensure analytical continuity. 
At the outset it should be noted that the author in 
presenting the model has made a deliberate attempt to omit 
explicit reference to the type of product or system (material 
or non-material, software or non-software) which is the 
subject of a development and acquisition effort. The ease in 
transforming the model is, by itself, an attribute which 
affirms the author's premise that the model possesses a strong 
potential for application to non-software material development 
programs such as the AAAV. 
Note: Information in this section which relates exclusively to 
the Spiral Model was derived principally from the risk 
management BOK data source #23 (Boehm, B.W., "A Spiral Model 
of Software Development and Enhancement", Software Management, 
IEEE Computer Society Press, CA., 1993). 
2.  Model Functions 
According to Boehm, the primary functions (attributes) of 
a system development process model such as the Spiral Model 
are to determine the "order of the stages" involved in system 
development and evolution and to establish the "transition 
criteria" for progressing from one stage to the next. These 
include completion criteria for the current stage plus choice 
criteria and entrance criteria for the next stage. By design, 
a system process model provides guidance on the order in which 
a program should carry out its major tasks. Thus, Boehm's 
Spiral Model addresses the following project questions: 
1. What shall we do next? 
2. How long shall we continue to do it?. [Ref 4:p. 120] 
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A review of the AAAV program risk management DSM 
(Reference Attribute Sub-Categories- Risk Management Planning, 
Risk Assessment, Risk Areas, Acquisition Strategy, Testing, 
Software Design and Development) reveals that this same 
approach is manifested and demonstrated in the AAAV program's 
acquisition strategy, acquisition schedule, and risk 
management plan. 
The Spiral Model is depicted in Figure 3. The radial 
dimension of this model represents the cumulative cost 
incurred in accomplishing the steps to date; the angular 
dimension represents the progress made in completing each 
cycle of the spiral. The Spiral Model reflects the underlying 
concept that each cycle involves a progression that addresses 
the same sequence of steps, for each portion of the product, 
and for each of its levels of elaboration. [Ref. 4:p. 124] 
Each cycle of the spiral commences with the 
identification of: 1) the objectives of the portion of the 
product being elaborated (performance, functionality, and 
ability to accommodate change); 2) the alternative means of 
implementing this portion of the product; and 3) the 
constraints imposed on the application of alternatives (cost, 
schedule, and interface). The next step is to evaluate the 
alternatives relative to the objectives and constraints. 
Frequently, and as delineated in the AAAV program risk 
management DSM (Reference Attribute Sub-Categories- Risk 
Analysis, Risk Assessment, Risk Mitigation, Development and 
Design), this process will identify areas of uncertainty that 
are significant sources of program risk. If so, the next step 
involves the development of a cost effective risk resolution 
strategy. 
This risk resolution strategy may involve prototyping, 
simulation, benchmarking, reference checking, user 
questionnaires, analytic modeling, or combinations of these 












identify, resolve risks 
neview 
Plan next phases 
Develop, verify 
next-level product 
Figure 3.  The Spiral Model 
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The AAAV program's risk management methodology incorporates 
each of the above listed attributes (Reference Attribute Sub- 
Categories- Risk Analysis, Risk Mitigation, Development and 
Design, Prototyping and Technology Demonstration, Modeling and 
Simulation). 
Boehm poses four fundamental questions that arise in 
considering the practicality and functionality of the Spiral 
Model: 
1. How does the spiral ever get started? 
2. How do you get off the spiral when it is appropriate 
to terminate a project early? 
3. Why does the spiral end so abruptly? 
4. What happens to system enhancement? 
The answer to these questions involves an observation 
that the Spiral Model applies equally to development or 
enhancement efforts. In either case, the spiral gets started 
by a hypothesis that a particular operational mission(s) could 
be improved by an acquisition effort. The spiral process then 
involves a test of the hypothesis. If the hypothesis fails 
the test, the spiral is terminated. Otherwise the spiral is 
terminated with the physical delivery and employment of the 
system, and the hypothesis is tested by observing the effect 
on the operational mission. Usually, experience with the 
operational mission leads to a further hypothesis about system 
improvements, and a new enhancement spiral is initiated to 
test the hypothesis. Initiation, termination, and iteration 
of the tasks and products of previous cycles are thus 
implicitly defined in the Spiral Model. [Ref. 4:p. 124] 
The AAAV "open architecture" and partitioned design 
coupled with the Pre-Planned Product Improvement acquisition 
strategy reveals that the Spiral Model possesses attributes 
which address the AAAV program enhancement effort (Reference 
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Attribute Sub-Categories- Acquisition Strategy, Development 
and Design). 
3. Model Features 
Boehm argues that the major distinguishing feature of the 
Spiral Model is that it creates a "risk driven" approach to a 
system development process rather than a "primarily document" 
driven approach [Ref. 4:p. 120]. It is this explicit 
orientation of the Spiral Model to the risk management 
discipline which qualified the model for inclusion into the 
risk management BOK. Accordingly, Boehm's article is listed 
in Chapter II, Literature Review, Section D, as an item of 
literature sampled for examination. As prescribed by the 
literature review methodology, the risk management BOK DSM, 
Appendix C, profiles the risk attributes featured in this 
particular data source. 
Another significant feature of the Spiral Model is that 
each cycle is completed by a review involving the primary 
people or organizations concerned with the product. This 
review covers all products developed during the previous 
cycle, including the plans for the next cycle and the 
resources required to carry them out. The review's major 
objective is to ensure that all concerned parties are mutually 
committed to the approach for the next phase. 
An examination of the risk management methodology 
employed in the AAAV program reveals the following attributes 
which reflect an intent, purpose, and function similar to the 
attributes discussed in the paragraph above: 
• The DRPM/AAAV conducts in-process reviews with the 
contractors to determine likelihood of delivering 
engine on time. (Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Risk 
Management Planning). 
• The DRPM/AAAV involves the product end user in risk 
documentation activities. (Reference Attribute Sub- 
Category- Risk Documentation). 
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• The DRPM/AAAV demonstrated the PSD to program 
stakeholders. (Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Risk 
Mitigation). 
• The DRPM/AAAV submitted and obtained favorable 
endorsements from the Office of Chief of Naval Research 
regarding technical risk reducing activities. 
(Reference Attribute Sub-Category- Risk Mitigation). 
• The DRPM/AAAV uses O&M personnel from FMF units at 
contractor facilities to comment on and assess 
technical, safety, training, maintenance, and human 
factors issues of the design. (Reference Attribute Sub- 
Category- Risk Documentation). 
• The DRPM/AAAV uses multi-disciplined teams, computer 
aided tools, and other system engineering tools by 
contractors to apply concept of concurrent engineering 
in development and production. (Reference Attribute 
Sub-Category- Development and Design). 
Boehm lists four other important features of the Spiral 
Model including :- 
1. It fosters the development of specifications that are 
not necessarily uniform, exhaustive, or formal, in that 
they defer detailed elaboration of low-risk elements 
until the high-risk elements of the design are stable. 
2. It incorporates prototyping and simulation as a risk 
reduction technique at any stage of development. This 
attribute is similarly contained in the risk management 
methodology for the AAAV program. (Reference Attribute 
Sub-Categories- Prototyping and Technology Demonstration, 
Modeling and Simulation). 
3. It accommodates reworks or go-backs to earlier stages 
as more attractive alternatives are identified or as new 
risk issues need resolution. 
4. It facilitates the use of risk driven documents, 
particularly specifications and plans as risk management 
tools. [Ref. 4:p. 127] 
Boehm acknowledges that efforts to apply the Spiral Model 
focus on creating a discipline of risk management which 
includes techniques for risk identification, risk analysis, 
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risk prioritization, risk management planning, and risk 
tracking. The risk management methodology for the AAAV 
program also explicitly contains techniques for risk analysis, 
and risk management planning. The remaining techniques--risk 
identification, risk prioritization, and risk tracking--are 
subsumed and/or subordinated within the risk assessment and 
risk areas attribute sub-categories. 
Boehm states that one product of this activity is the 
development of a prioritized "top 10 list" of program risk 
items. Another product is the formation of a "Risk Management 
Plan" illustrated in Table 1 below. [Ref. 4:pp. 129-130] 
1. Identify the project's top 10 risk items. 
2. Present a plan for resolving each risk item. 
3. Update list of top risk items, plan, and results 
monthly. 
4. Highlight risk-item status in monthly project 
reviews. 
* Compare with previous month's rankings, status. 
5. Initiate appropriate corrective actions. 
Table 1.  Risk Management Plan. 
The Risk Management Plan ensures that each project makes 
an early identification of its top risk items (the number 10 
is not an absolute requirement), develops a strategy for 
resolving the risk items, identifies and sets down an agenda 
to resolve risk items as they surface, and highlights progress 
versus plans in monthly reviews. 
An evaluation of the risk management methodology for the 
AAAV program reveals that the DRPM/AAAV has established a risk 
management plan, and has developed a risk mitigation strategy. 
The risk management methodology for the AAAV program does not, 
however, make explicit reference to a prioritized "top 10 
list" of program risk items. (Reference Attribute Sub- 
Categories- Risk Management Planning, Risk Mitigation). 
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As noted earlier, the Spiral Model with the aid of the 
Risk Management Plan, and the DRPM/AAAV with the aid of the 
risk management methodology, focus on early prototyping, 
simulation, modeling, benchmarking, and other risk resolving 
techniques to help avoid potential program "show-stoppers." 
The Risk Management Plan and the maturing set of techniques 
for risk management provide a foundation for tailoring and 
adopting Spiral Model concepts into the more established 
system acquisition and development procedures employed in the 
AAAV program. [Ref. 4:p. 130] 
E.  SUMMARY 
This chapter delivered a comparative analysis of risk 
management methodology implemented in the AAAV acquisition 
program to methodology recommended and/or prescribed by the 
risk management BOK. The analysis reveals: 1) five distinct 
risk attribute sub-categories explicitly profiled in the risk 
management BOK which are not similarly profiled in the AAAV 
program methodology; and 2) two distinct risk attribute sub- 
categories explicitly profiled in the AAAV program methodology 
not similarly profiled in the risk management BOK. Finally, 
an analysis of the Spiral Model concluded that there are 
several attributes of the model which merit application within 
the AAAV acquisition program. 
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V.   CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The focus of this research effort was to examine and 
compare risk management attributes (concepts, policy, 
guidance, strategies, and techniques) delineated in the risk 
management BOK and in the U.S. Marine Corps AAAV program. The 
conclusions and recommendations drawn from this evaluation are 
not intended to criticize individuals and organizations 
responsible for formulating and promulgating risk management 
policy and instruction for the DoD. Similarly, they are not 
intended to criticize the performance of individuals and 
organizations involved in the AAAV risk management methodology 
development process. Rather, this analysis suggests potential 
areas of opportunity for improving the AAAV program's risk 
management process, and highlight logical enhancements to the 
overall risk management BOK. Based on this study the 
following conclusions and recommendations are made. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The DSM technique used in this thesis provided a 
viable mechanism to extract detailed information from numerous 
research data sources. 
The DSM technique presents clear advantages to Defense 
Systems Management College, Naval Postgraduate School, and 
other faculty and students involved in research activities. 
The DSM technique can be easily tailored to accommodate 
inherently quantitative/empirical data, as well as qualitative 
information. Furthermore, application of this information 
gathering and organization technique can directly assist any 
acquisition professional involved in the process of 
developing, comprehending, or improving their respective risk 
management program. 
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2. The DRPM/AAAV, PM, or any acquisition professional 
could benefit from applying the risk management BOK DSM as a 
tool to formulate or improve their risk management plan. 
Program Managers tasked with initially developing or 
revising their risk management plans would benefit from 
consulting all available systems acquisition and program 
management literature and documents which provide policy, 
regulation, and guidance.  The breadth of this literature is 
extensive and includes, but is not limited to, the following 
categories: 1) OSD memorandums, reports and initiatives; 2) 
OMB  Circular A-109 Major Systems Acquisitions;  3)  DoD 
Directives and Instructions; 4) Service specific regulations; 
and 5) Military Standards (MIL-STDs). 
Supplementing Federal policy documents and Service 
department directives are literature resources available from 
academia and from private sector institutions. Major 
literature resources available to the PM from this latter 
category include the current family of technical guidebooks 
published by the DSMC and the series of management handbooks 
published by the PMI. 
In the aggregate, the segment of program management 
literature which pertains to the discipline of risk management 
composes the risk management BOK. The risk management BOK 
offers a substantial sample and range of risk management and 
mitigation policies, guidance, strategies, and techniques. 
The domain of risk management strategies and techniques was 
evaluated for its functional purposes, was assembled into 2 0 
distinct risk management sub-categories, and was presented 
collectively in the risk management BOK DSM (Appendix C) . 
Each sub-category profiled individual risk attributes 
discerned from the literature review process. The military 
acquisition professional preparing to undertake a risk 
management program should use the risk management BOK DSM in 
formulating or improving their risk management plan. 
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3. The DRPM/AAAV has employed a coherent and 
comprehensive risk management plan. which effectively 
addresses and mitigates known program risks, and which 
converges markedly with the risk management BOK. 
The risk management methodology employed in the AAAV 
program offers a multi-functional, mutually supporting range 
of risk management strategies and techniques to mitigate the 
principal areas of technical, supportability, cost, and 
schedule risks identified by the DRPM/AAAV. Attributes of the 
DRPM' s methodology were evaluated for their functional purpose 
and were assembled into 17 distinct risk management sub- 
categories. Each sub-category profiled individual risk 
attributes discerned from the AAAV program management 
documentation and literature review process. The domain of 
risk management attributes was presented collectively in the 
risk management DSM for the AAAV program (Appendix D) . A 
comparative analysis between the two domains revealed 15 
notable areas of similar intent, purpose, and function. Areas 
of convergence appeared collectively at the risk attribute 
sub-category level and individually at the risk attribute 
element level within a sub-category. 
4. Some differences exist between the risk management 
methodology recommended and/or prescribed in the risk 
management BOK and the AAAV program risk management 
methodology. 
A comparative analysis of risk management methodology 
implemented in the AAAV acquisition program to methodology 
recommended and/or prescribed by the risk management BOK 
revealed five distinct risk attribute sub-categories (Risk 
Management Concepts, Risk Identification, Manufacturing 
Considerations, Schedule Considerations, and Warranty 
Considerations) explicitly profiled in the risk management BOK 
which were not similarly profiled in the AAAV program 
methodology. 
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The analysis also revealed two distinct risk attribute sub- 
categories (Modeling and Simulation, and Systems Integration) 
explicitly profiled in the AAAV program methodology which were 
not similarly profiled in the risk management BOK. 
5. The risk management and mitigation methodology 
implemented in the AAAV acquisition program contributes to the 
overall risk management BOK. 
There are two main areas where this contribution occurs. 
First, is the Modeling and Simulation (M&S) domain. The DRPM 
is aggressively employing M&S as a major and distinct risk 
management initiative complementary but not subordinate to the 
program's T&E effort. Additionally, the DRPM's allocation of 
special resources to the M&S effort firmly positioned the 
program to address three objectives: 1) What can M&S bring to 
the AAAV acquisition process?; 2) Will M&S technology produce 
cost savings for the AAAV acquisition program?; and 3) Can 
simulation systems acquired for testing also be used for 
training?. Second is the Systems Integration domain. The 
AAAV program risk management methodology treatment and 
classification of Systems Integration issues differs markedly 
from the risk management BOK. The usual parameters within 
which a PM operates are performance, cost, and schedule. To 
decrease overall risk in the AAAV program, Human Systems 
Integration (HSI) has been designated by the DRPM/AAAV as an 
additional parameter and as such became a separate risk 
management initiative. These findings support the author's 
premise that each Service can learn and benefit from the 
successes of AAAV program's risk management methodology. 
6. There are attributes of "Spiral Model" which are and 
which can be applied within the AAAV acquisition program. 
The Spiral Model with the aid of the Risk Management 
Plan, and the DRPM/AAAV with the aid of the risk management 
methodology, focus on early prototyping, simulation, modeling, 
benchmarking, and other risk resolving techniques to help 
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avoid potential program "show-stoppers." The Risk Management 
Plan and the maturing set of techniques for risk management 
provide a foundation for tailoring and adopting Spiral Model 
concepts into the more established system acquisition and 
development procedures employed in the AAAV program. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. That the Naval Postgraduate School, Defense Systems 
Management College, and other Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) institutions encourage resident faculty and students to 
use the DSM technique when appropriate for research 
applications. 
2. That the DRPM/AAAV, PM, and military acquisition 
professionals consider the risk management BOK in the 
formulation or improvement of their risk management plan. 
3. That the DRPM/AAAV investigate establishing a systems 
integration working group consisting of: 1) representatives of 
the AAAV program office; 2) representatives of the Marine 
Corps supporting establishment; 3) representatives of the user 
community; and 4) representatives of industry. The objective 
of this group is to identify, analyze, and resolve system 
integration issues. This will unify the presentation of 
systems integration issues to the Marine Corps and to industry 
and optimize total system performance, minimize LCC, and 
mitigate program risks. 
4. That the DRPM/AAAV consider conducting, at a minimum, 
two risk assessments, early and late, in each acquisition 
phase.  This assessment frequency complies with the GAO's 
recommendation #2 contained in reference 2 of this thesis. 
5. That the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
consider  standardizing  definitions  of  risk  management 
terminology and concepts and provide precise but flexible risk 
management guidelines when formulating or revising acquisition 
policy. 
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6. That the DRPM/AAAV evaluate specifying a contractor 
risk assessment program as a separate management criterion in 
the D&V contract source selection evaluation process. 
7. That the DRPM/AAAV investigate the feasibility, 
advantages, and disadvantages of implementing a risk driven, 
cyclic, process development model, such as the Spiral Model, 
within the AAAV acquisition program. 
D.  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Analysis of the application of Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) as a risk mitigation technique. Students 
selecting this research topic could investigate the role and 
mission of the DMSO, perform case studies, and analytically 
compare M&S efforts of previous and active DoD weapon system 
acquisition programs. 
2. Investigate critical HSI issues affecting predecessor 
and comparable DoD system acquisition programs. Students 
selecting this research topic could perform case studies, and 
conduct comparative analyses between HSI efforts on-going in 
DoD acquisition programs. 
3. Investigate the feasibility, advantages, and 
disadvantages of implementing risk driven, cyclic, process 
development models, such as the Spiral Model, within DoD 
weapon system acquisition programs. 
4. Investigate the feasibility, cost, and merit of the 
selected AAAV D&V prime contractor implementing the Contractor 
Risk Assessment Program (CRAG). 
5. Study the policies, guidance, and instruction 
published by the Department of Defense relating to the 
identification, assessment, analysis, and mitigation of 
external risks within DoD weapon systems acquisition programs. 
Students selecting this topic could perform a comparative 
analysis of DoD employed methodologies with methodologies 
employed by private sector institutions. 
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6. Investigate policies and procedures of the U.S. 
Marine Corps, the DRPM/AAAV, and prime contractors to ensure 
control and accountability of Government Furnished Material 
(GFM) and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) in support of 
the AAAV acquisition program. 
7. Study the Marine Corps' plans for Integrated 
Logistics Support (ILS) of the AAAV system once fielded. 
Students could evaluate: 1) proposed and alternative 
maintenance support scenarios; 2) facilities requirements; 3) 
spare parts and secondary reparable provisioning; and 4) Table 
of Equipment (T/E) material allowance and allocation issues. 
8. Study issues associated with the impact of the new 
AAAV system on the environment.  For example, students could 
evaluate the environmental impact of the Marine Corps plan for 
developing, and maintaining a Chemical Agent Resistant Coating 
(CARC) operation in support of the fielded AAAV system. 
9. Investigate issues, feasibility, advantages, and 
disadvantages associated with the DRPM/AAAV employment of an 
"evolutionary" acquisition strategy but supported by a 
"classical" test and evaluation (T&E) approach. 
10. Investigate Marine Corps' plans for design, 
development, and integration of software into the AAAV system, 
subsystem, and components. 
11. Investigate methods of encouraging production 
competition at the prime AAAV contractor level. Students 
selecting this topic could research and analyze the 
implications of the detailed component breakout review planned 
for the D&V phase. 
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APPENDIX A.  LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS 
AAA Advanced Amphibious Assault 
AAAV Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
ACMC Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps 
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
AFS Advanced Filtration System 
AFV Armored Family of Vehicles 
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process 
APC Armored Personnel Carrier 
APG Aberdeen Proving Grounds 
APPDM Automated Program Planning Documentation 
ATD Advanced Technology Demonstrator 
ATR Automotive Test Rig 
AVTD Amphibian Vehicle Test Directorate 
BH&T Ballistic Hull and Turret 
BOK Body of Knowledge 
CARC Chemical Agent Resistant Coating 
CART Corrective Action Review Team 
CDR Critical Design Review 
CE/D Concept Exploration and Definition 
CM Configuration Management 
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps 
CMP Configuration Management Plan 
CNA Center for Naval Analysis 
CNR Center for Naval Research 
COEA Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
CPAF Cost-Plus-Award-Fee 
CPIF Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee 
CPR Cost Performance Report 
CRAG Contractors Risk Assessment Guide 
C/SCSC Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria 
DAB Defense Acquisition Board 
DAU Defense Acquisition University 
D&V Demonstration and Validation 
DEMVAL Demonstration and Validation 
DMSO Defense Modeling and Simulation Office 
DoD Department of Defense 
DRB Defense Resources Board 
DRPM Direct Reporting Program Manager 
DSM Data Source Matrix 
DSMC Defense Systems Management College 
DT Development Test 
DT&E Development Test and Evaluation 
DTIC Defense Technical Information Center 
EDCAS Equipment Designers Cost Analysis System 
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EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
EOA Early Operational Assessment 
ERDEC Environmental Research, Development, and 
Engineering Command 
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FAT First Article Testing 
FCA Functional Configuration Audit 
FFP Firm-Fixed-Price 
FMECA Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
FMF Fleet Marine Force 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
FOC Full Operational Capability 
FOT&E Follow-On Test and Evaluation 
FQR Formal Qualification Review 
FRP Full-Rate Production 
FY Fiscal Year 
GAO General Accounting Office 
GDLS General Dynamics Land Systems 
GFE Government Furnished Equipment 
GFM Government Furnished Material 
HSI Human Systems Integration 
HTR Hydrodynamic Test Rig 
H/W Hardware 
HWS High Water Speed 
HWSTD High Water Speed Technology Demonstrator 
ICE Independent Cost Estimate 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
IG Inspector General 
ILS Integrated Logistics Support 
ILSP Integrated Logistics Support Plan 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
IPL Integrated Priorities List 
IPS Integrated Program Summary 
IR&D Independent Research and Development 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushion 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LCCE Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
LFT&E Live Fire Test and Evaluation 
LRIP Low Rate Initial Production 
LRU Line Reparable Unit 
MAA Mission Area Analysis 
MBT Main Battle Tank 
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Center 
MCOTEA Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation 
Activity 
MDA Milestone Decision Authority 
MIL-STD Military Standard 
MNS Mission Need Statement 
MP Manufacturing Plan 
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MS Milestone 
M&S Modeling and Simulation 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical 
NDI Non-Developmental Item 
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center 
OA Operational Assessment 
OAT Office of Advanced Technology- 
O&M Operations and Maintenance 
O&S Operations and Support 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
OMFTS Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
ONR Office of Naval Research 
OOA Object Oriented Approach 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OT Operational Test 
OTA Operational Test Agency- 
OTH Over the Horizon 
OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation 
OTS Off-The-Shelf 
OSD Office of Secretary of Defense 
PCA Physical Configuration Audit 
PDM Program Decision Memorandum 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PERT Program Evaluation Review Technique 
PM Program Manager 
PMI Project Management Institute 
PMP Program Management Plan 
POM Program Objective Memorandum 
PPS Post Production Support 
PRR Production Readiness Review 
PSD Propulsion System Demonstrator 
PTLD Physical Teardown and Logistics Demonstration 
QA Quality Assurance 
QTR Quarter 
RFP Request for Proposal 
RMP Risk Management Plan 
SCRE Stratified Charge Rotary Engine 
SDR System Design Review 
SEMP Systems Engineering Management Plan 
SLEP Service Life Extension Program 
SOW Statement of Work 
SRR Systems Requirements Review 
SSR Software Specification Review 
S/W Software 
SWS Slow Water Speed 
TACOM Tank Automotive Command 
T/E Table of Equipment 
T&E Test and Evaluation 
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
TIWG Test Integration Working Group 
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TPM Technical Performance Measurement 
TQM Total Quality Management 
TRR Test Requirements Review 
UDLP United Defense Limited Partnership 
USC United States Code 
USD(A) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
WBS Work Breakdown Structure 
84 
APPENDIX B.  GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
To alleviate reader confusion, definitions for terms not 
commonly used are provided alphabetically below.  Whenever 
possible terms are defined accordingly to DoD standard 
terminology. For each term, the literature item (data source) 
providing the definition is cited. 
Acquisition Category- Categories established to facilitate 
decentralized decision making and execution and compliance 
with statutorily imposed requirements. The categories 
determine the level of review, decision authority, and 
applicable procedures. (Department of Defense, Glossary: 
Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, DSMC, Ft. Belvoir, 
VA., September, 1991.) 
Amount at Stake- The extent of adverse consequences which 
could occur to the project. ("Project and Program Risk 
Management: A Guide to Managing Project Risks and 
Opportunities", Project Management Institute, Upper Darby, 
PA., 1992.) 
Body of Knowledge- Encompasses the total population of 
published reference materials pertaining to a particular topic 
of interest. For this thesis the BOK relates to reference 
materials relating to the functional area of risk management. 
(Author.) 
Cost Risk- The risk to a program in terms of overrunning the 
program cost. (Department of Defense, Risk Management 
Concepts and Guidance, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., March, 1989.) 
High Risk (Cost)- Scope of work and level of effort required 
are not well defined. The nature of the task to be performed 
differs significantly from previous tasks for which historical 
cost data exists. Historical cost data is unreliable, 
uncertain or incomplete and does not provide a good basis for 
estimation. (U.S. Marine Corps. Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV) Program Integrated Program Summary (IPS), 
Office of the DRPM, Arlington, VA., October, 1994.) 
High Risk (Schedule) - The scope of work and the effort 
required are not well defined. Therefore, the time required 
cannot be well defined. The schedule is very optimistic and 
can succeed only if all supporting and subordinate tasks can 
be completed on time. The schedule is dependent upon 
uncontrollable external events such as weather, or upon 
delivery of long lead time items for which the lead time is 
not well defined.  The work package is on the critical path. 
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Delays in this area will impact the entire program. 
(U.S. Marine Corps. Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) 
Program Integrated Program Summary (IPS). Office of the DRPM, 
Arlington, VA., October, 1994.) 
High Risk (Technical)- Requires the use of new materials, new 
production techniques, new components or new subsystem 
concepts previously undeveloped. The materials, techniques or 
components are not used in similar applications or only 
limited experience exists. Involves an area of technology 
which is not well known or well defined. Extrapolation from 
existing technology is uncertain and might cause program 
delays due to experimentation required to achieve success. 
Potential hazards may exist. Supply, repair, maintenance is 
not standard within U.S. military. Involves learning new 
skills or supplying items with little or no commonality to 
other systems; unique to AAAV. (U.S. Marine Corps, Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) Program Integrated Program 
Summary (IPS). Office of the DRPM, Arlington, VA., October, 
1994.) 
Low Risk (Cost)- The work is well defined as to its scope and 
nature, and the level of effort required can be accurately 
estimated. The estimate is based on the contractor's response 
to a RFP or similar document. Historical cost data for 
similar tasks provides an excellent basis for estimation. 
(U.S. Marine Corps. Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) 
Program Integrated Program Summary (IPS). Office of the DRPM, 
Arlington, VA., October, 1994.) 
Low Risk (Schedule)- The work is well defined and routine in 
nature. There is little probability of unforeseen problems 
arising which would delay the schedule. The work is underway 
and on schedule. The work is on the critical path and 
adequate time exists to accommodate considerable slippage 
before it impacts the program. (U.S. Marine Corps. Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) Program Integrated Program 
Summary (IPS). Office of the DRPM, Arlington, VA., October, 
1994.) 
Low Risk (Technical)- Involves the use of proven, existing 
components or subsystems whose characteristics are well known 
and documented. Any new design work required involves scaling 
or adapting the item to the application. Uses materials, 
production techniques and design concepts which are well 
known, tested, and proven. Involves an area of technology 
that is well known and documented. Component/it em known to be 
safe with high reliability. Common on other vehicles. Not 
AAAV unique. (U.S. Marine Corps. Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV) Program Integrated Program Summary (IPS). 
Office of the DRPM, Arlington, VA., October, 1994.) 
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Moderate Risk (Cost)- Scope of work to be accomplished and 
level of effort required are reasonably well known. The 
nature of the task to be performed is similar to previous 
tasks for which good cost data exists. Historical cost data 
provides a reasonable basis for estimation. (U.S. Marine 
Corps. Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) Program 
Integrated Program Summary (IPS), Office of the DRPM, 
Arlington, VA., October, 1994.) 
Moderate Risk (Schedule)- The scope of work, and hence the 
time required, is reasonably well defined. The schedule 
allows sufficient time unless unforeseen difficulties arise. 
The work is underway, but is behind schedule. The work 
package is not on the critical path and some time exists which 
can be used for delays without affecting other elements of the 
program. (U.S. Marine Corps. Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV) Program Integrated Program Summary (IPS). 
Office of the DRPM, Arlington, VA., October, 1994.) 
Moderate Risk (Technical)- Requires the use of new materials, 
new production techniques, a new component, or new subsystem 
not currently fielded in a combat vehicle or similar heavy 
off-road equipment concept.  However, enough is known about 
the materials, techniques, components or concepts in question 
from laboratory and prototype testing or related applications, 
to provide reasonable assurance of achieving design goals. 
On-vehicle performance, reliability, and durability must be 
proven.  Involves an area of technology not demonstrated at 
the required performance level.  However, extrapolation from 
known data appears reasonable and should not involve a major 
technology breakthrough.  Component not in the Marine Corps 
supply system, but is repairable with current skills levels. 
(U.S. Marine Corps. Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) 
Program Integrated Program Summary (IPS). Office of the DRPM, 
Arlington, VA., October, 1994.) 
Program Risk- The probability of not achieving a defined cost, 
schedule, or technical performance goal. (Department of 
Defense, Risk Management Concepts and Guidance. Defense 
Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., March, 1989.) 
Programm*Hg PH«fc- The risks involved in obtaining and using 
applicable resources and activities that are outside of the 
programs control, but can affect the program's direction. 
(Department of Defense, Risk Management Concepts and Guidance. 
Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., March, 
1989.) 
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Project Risk Management- Is the art and science of 
identifying, assessing and responding to project risk 
throughout the life of a project and in the best interests of 
its objectives. ("Project and Program Risk Management: A 
Guide to Managing Project Risks and Opportunities", Project 
Management Institute, Upper Darby, PA., 1992.) 
Quality Risk- Failure to complete tasks to the required level 
of technical or quality performance.  ("Project and Program 
Risk Management: A Guide to Managing Project Risks and 
Opportunities", Project Management Institute, Upper Darby, 
PA., 1992.) 
Risk- The condition of having outcomes with known 
probabilities of occurrence, not certainty of occurrence. 
(Department of Defense, Risk Management Concepts and Guidance, 
Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., March, 
1989.) 
Risk Analysis- An examination of risk areas or events to 
determine options and the probable consequences for each event 
in the analysis. (Department of Defense, Glossary: Defense 
Acquisition Acronyms and Terms. DSMC, Ft. Belvoir, VA. , 
September, 1991.) 
Risk Assessment- The process of examining all aspects of a 
program with the goal of identifying areas of risk and the 
corresponding potential impact. (Department of Defense, Risk 
Management Concepts and Guidance. Defense Systems Management 
College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., March, 1989.) 
Risk Documentation- The formalized process of recording risk 
events and experience on past programs, preferably of a 
similar nature.  (Author) 
Risk Event- The precise description of what might happen to 
the detriment of the project. ("Project and Program Risk 
Management: A Guide to Managing Project Risks and 
Opportunities", Project Management Institute, Upper Darby, 
PA., 1992.) 
Risk Handling- The action or inaction taken to address the 
risk issues identified and evaluated in the risk assessment 
and risk analysis efforts. (Department of Defense, Risk 
Management Concepts and Guidance. Defense Systems Management 
College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., March, 1989.) 
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Risk Identification- The first step in the risk assessment 
process. It is the organized thorough approach to seek out 
the real risks associated with the program. (Department of 
Defense, Risk Management Concepts and Guidance, Defense 
Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., March, 1989.) 
Risk Management- All actions taken to identify, assess, and 
eliminate or reduce risk to an acceptable level in selected 
areas (e.g., cost, schedule, technical, producibility, etc.); 
and the total program. (Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition), DoD Instruction 5000.2 Defense Acquisition 
Management Policies and Procedures. Department of Defense, 
February 23, 1991.) 
Risk Planning- Forcing organized purposeful thought to the 
subject of eliminating, minimizing, or containing the effects 
of undesirable occurrences. It allows for: 1) eliminating 
risk wherever possible; 2) isolating and minimizing risks; 3) 
developing alternative courses of action; and, 4) establishing 
time and money reserves to cover risks that can be avoided. 
(Department of Defense, Risk Management Concepts and Guidance, 
Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., March, 
1989.) 
Risk Probability- The degree to which the risk event is likely 
to occur. ("Project and Program Risk Management: A Guide to 
Managing Project Risks and Opportunities", Project Management 
Institute, Upper Darby, PA., 1992.) 
Risk Response- The actions taken by a program manager after 
confronted with a risk.  (Author) 
Schedule Risk- Failure to complete tasks within the estimated 
time limits, or risks associated with dependency network 
logic. ("Project and Program Risk Management: A Guide to 
Managing Project Risks and Opportunities", Project Management 
Institute, Upper Darby, PA., 1992.) 
Scope Risk- Risks associated with changes of scope, or the 
subsequent need for "fixes" to achieve the required technical 
deliverables. ("Project and Program Risk Management: A Guide 
to Managing Project Risks and Opportunities", Project 
Management Institute, Upper Darby, PA., 1992.) 
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Simulation- A method for implementing a model. It is the 
process of conducting experiments with a model for the purpose 
of understanding the behavior of the system modeled under 
selected conditions or of evaluating various strategies for 
the operation of the system within the limits imposed by 
developmental or operational criteria. (Department of 
Defense, Glossary: Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms. 
DSMC, Ft. Belvoir, VA., September, 1991.) 
Supportability Risk- The risks associated with fielding and 
maintaining systems which are currently being developed or 
have been developed and are being deployed. (Department of 
Defense, Risk Management Concepts and Guidance. Defense 
Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., March, 1989.) 
Technical Risk- The risk associated with evolving a new design 
to provide a greater level of performance than previously 
demonstrated. Includes the same or lesser level of 
performance subject to new constraints such as size or 
weights. (Department of Defense, Risk Management Concepts and 
Guidance, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, 
VA., March, 1989.) 
Uncertainty- A condition, event, outcome, or circumstance of 
which the extent, value, or consequence is not predictable. 
State of knowledge about outcomes in a decision which are such 
that it is not possible to assign probabilities in advance. 
Ignorance about the order of things. (Department of Defense, 
Glossary: Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms. DSMC, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., September, 1991.) 
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APPENDIX C.  DATA SOURCE MATRIX FOR RISK BOK 
The following legend defines the risk content indicator coding 
scheme utilized in the following matrix: 
1. "M" coded attributes denote a risk concept, task or 
process element which is mandatory/compulsory for the 
effected PM organization to accomplish, incorporate or 
adopt. 
2. "R" coded attributes denote a risk concept, task or 
process element which is recommended or suggested for 
consideration, incorporation or adoption. 
3. "S" coded attributes denote an risk concept, task or 
process element specified, described or defined in an 
informational context. 
4. "I" coded attributes denote a risk concept, task or 
process element which was implied or inferred by the data 
source. 
5. A "Blank" denotes no explicit nor implicit risk 
attribute coverage. 
The below listed literature items represent thesis research 
data sources utilized and are portrayed in the same numerical 
sequence along the top horizontal margin of the following risk 
management BOK Data Source Matrix: 
1. Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-109 
Manor Systems Acquisition. Washington, D.C., April 5, 
1976. 
2. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5000.1 Defense 
Acquisition, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), 
February 23, 1991. 
3. Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 5000.2 Defense 
Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures, Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), February 23, 1991. 
4. Department of Defense, DoD Manual 5000.2-M Defense 
Acquisition Management Documentation and Reports, Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), February 23, 1991. 
5. Department of Defense, Military Standard-499B Systems 
Engineering, May 6, 1992. 
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6. Department of Defense, Risk Management Concepts and 
Guidance. Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., March, 1989. 
7. Department of Defense, Program Manager's Notebook, 
Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., 
June, 1992. 
8. Department of Defense, Systems Engineering Management 
Guide, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, 
VA., January, 199 0. 
9. Department of Defense, Test and Evaluation Management 
Guide. Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, 
VA., August, 1993. 
10. Department of Defense, Integrated Logistics Support 
Guide, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, 
VA., May, 1986. 
11. Department of Defense, Defense Manufacturing 
Management Guide. Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., April, 1989. 
12. Department of Defense, Competitive Production 
Handbook. Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., August, 1984. 
13. Department of Defense, Sub-Contracting Management 
Handbook, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA., May, 1988. 
14. Department of Defense, Technology Transfer Guide. 
Defense Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., 
November, 1988. 
15. Department of Defense, Warranty Guidebook. Defense 
Systems Management College, Ft. Belvoir, VA., October, 
1992. 
16. Department of Defense, Mission Critical Computer 
Resources Management. Defense Systems Management College, 
Ft. Belvoir, VA., undated. 
17. Department of Navy, Best Practices: How to Avoid 
Surprises in the World's Most Complicated Technical 
Process. NAVSO P-6071, March, 1986. 
18. Department of Navy, Cost Realism Handbook, Navy 
Office for Acquisition Research, Washington, D.C., May, 
1985. 
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19. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Technical Risk 
Assessment-The Status of Current DoD Efforts", GAO/PEMB- 
86-5, Washington, D.C., April, 1986. 
20. Harp, D.M., A Management Case Analysis of the DoD 
Contractor Risk Assessment Program, M.S. Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., December, 1990. 
21. Yosua, D.A., "Risk Management in Military 
Acquisition Projects", Military Project Management 
Handbook, Mc Graw-Hill, Inc., 1992. 
22. "Project and Program Risk Management: A Guide to 
Managing Project Risks and Opportunities", Project 
Management Institute, Upper Darby, PA., 1992. 
23. Boehm, B.W., "A Spiral Model of Software Development 
and Enhancement", Software Management, IEEE Computer 
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APPENDIX D.  DATA SOURCE MATRIX FOR AAAV PROGRAM 
The following legend defines the risk content indicator coding 
scheme utilized: 
1. "A" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which has been 
applied within the AAAV program. 
2. "0" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which is on-going 
within the AAAV program. 
3. "P" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which has been 
identified for future application within the AAAV 
program. 
4. "R" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which has been 
recommended for application within the AAAV program. 
5. "*" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy or technique which has been 
applied, is ongoing and is planned for continued 
application within the AAAV program. 
6. "S" coded attributes denote a risk management 
concept, task, strategy, technique, or condition which 
has been specified as effecting the AAAV program. 
7. A "Blank" denotes no explicit nor implicit risk 
attribute coverage. 
The below listed literature items represent thesis research 
data sources utilized and are portrayed in the same numerical 
sequence along the top horizontal margin of the following Data 
Source Matrix for the AAAV Program: 
1. U.S. Marine Corps, Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD) for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) , 
CG. MCCDC, Quantico, VA. , March 24, 1994. 
2. U.S. Marine Corps, Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV) Program Integrated Program Summary (IPS), 
Office of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, 
Arlington, VA., October, 1994. 
Ill 
3.  U.S. Marine Corps, Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle  (AAAV) 
Program, Office of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, 
Arlington, VA., July 8, 1994. 
4. U.S. Marine Corps, System/Segment Specification (Type 
"A" Spec.) for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
(AAAV) Program. Office of the Direct Reporting Program 
Manager, Arlington, VA., August, 1994. 
5. U.S. Marine Corps, Human System Integration (HSI) 
Plan for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) 
Program, Office of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, 
Arlington, VA., March 8, 1994. 
6. Department of Navy, Technical Assessment. Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) Updated Concepts. 
Office of Advanced Technology, Chief of Naval Research, 
Washington, D.C., November 15, 1992. 
7. Center for Naval Analysis, Advanced Amphibious 
Assault (AAA) Program Cost and Operational Effectiveness 
Analysis (COEA) : Ship-to-Shore Analysis. Alexandria, VA., 
July, 1990. 
8. Center for Naval Analysis, Life Cycle Costs of 
Advanced Amphibious Assault System Candidates. 
Alexandria, VA., January, 1991. 
9. Center for Naval Analysis, Revised Life Cycle Costs 
for Advanced Amphibious Assault System Candidates, 
Alexandria, VA., April, 1991. 
10. U.S. Marine Corps, An Opportunity for Change: A 
Briefing for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Office 
of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, Arlington, VA., 
June, 1993. 
11. U.S. Marine Corps, "Commandant of the Marine Corps' 
AAA Article", AAV-AAA Requirements Office, MCCDC, 
Quantico, VA., September, 1993. 
12. Department of Defense, Audit Report; Acquisition of 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles. Rpt.No. 93-116, DoD 
Inspector General, Washington, D.C., June 18, 1993. 
13. Department of Defense, FY-94 Integrated Priority 
List (IPL) Administrative Guidelines. Defense Simulation 
and Modeling Office (DMSO), Washington, D.C., 1994. 
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14. Holzer, Robert., "Testing Simulation's Worth", Navy- 
Times , January 24, 1994. 
15. Robertson, B.J., "From Ship to Shore-And Well 
Beyond", Armed Forces Journal, September, 1994. 
16. Corcoran, Michael. A., An Evaluation of Competitive 
Procurement Methodologies Applicable to the AAA Program, 
M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., 
December, 1988. 
17. Clark, James. W., Acquisition Streamlining: A Viable 
Method for Accelerating Procurement of the AAAV, M.S. 
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